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In a political climate increasingly sensitive to the property owners' rights
to be free from regulatory intrusions by the federal government, the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) has become a popular symbolic target for
property rights advocates. This Article suggests that the ESA is a far less
significant threat to private property owners than is often supposed. First, the
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence protects property owners from
excessive ESA enforcement by influencing the way in which environmental
regulations are drafted and implemented. Second, the ESA itself contains
provisions embodying the Fifth Amendment guarantee against uncompensated
takings. The Article demonstrates that as the Court has become more willing
to find regulatory takings in recent years, the ESA has been administered with
increasing regard to the protection ofprivate property.
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Introduction
A. Background
Hailed by some as the most successful environmental law in the last
quarter century,' reviled by others as an unjustified intrusion on private
property rights,2 the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or the Act)3 is
nothing if not controversial. The rhetoric over the ESA has been particularly
vitriolic in recent years as the Act has come to epitomize, for some,4 the
excesses of the federal regulatory state. Accordingly, current debate over the
ESA is as much about the role of government in general, and the federal
government in particular, as it is about the need to protect endangered species.
The Republican party's takeover of Congress in 1994 and its inclusion of the
Private Property Protection Act in its Contract with America further polarized
discussion of the ESA, shifting focus from species preservation to private
property protection. Though attempts to make compensable any significant
reduction in property value occasioned by the ESA (or other federal
regulation) were ultimately unsuccessful in the 104th Congress,' similar
efforts are being considered in the 105th Congress.
1. Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt describes the Endangered Species Act as "undeniably the
most innovative, wide-reaching, and successful environmental law which has been enacted in the last
quarter century." Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and "Takings": A Call for Innovation
Within the Terms ofthe Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 356 (1994).
2. U.S. Representative Charles H. Taylor, a supporter of the Private Property Protection Act
(which, had it been passed, would have required government compensation when government action or
regulation resulted in a reduction in property value of 10% or more), criticized the ESA as "sav[ing] few
species, discourag[ing] good stewardship, and [being] economically unjust." Charles H. Taylor,
Property Rights Debate Frames Arguments for Regulatory Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 779, 785
(1996).
3. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 2.
5. In March of 1995, the House of Representatives passed The Private Property Protection Act of
1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995). Had it been signed into law, H.R. 925 would have required
payments to property owners whenever the value of any portion of land or water rights was diminished
by 20% or more as a result of federal endangered species or wetlands laws. See id. § 3(a). The Omnibus
Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995), failed to come to a vote in the Senate. S. 605
was similar to H.R. 925 in requiring compensation for diminution in property owners' value;
compensation, however, would have been available for diminution resulting from any federal action, but
only when value was diminished by one third or more. See id. § 204(a)(2)(D).
6. Although it is too early to know for sure whether the 105th Congress will succeed in passing a
landowner compensation bill, there are indications that such a bill will face significant political
opposition. Given the success of conservation groups at portraying the Republican-led 104th Congress
as anti-environmental (14 of 18 House Republicans who lost were on the Sierra Club's environmental
"hit list"), this Congress has been seen as taking a more moderate approach to the environment. Indeed,
conservative Republican Senator Dirk Kempthorne (Idaho) has spearheaded an effort to reauthorize
(rather than repeal) the ESA. A bill to reauthorize the Endangered Species Act, S. 1180, 105th Cong.
(1997), has won the support of moderate Republicans, as well as the Clinton Administration. See F.
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The ESA is an important symbolic target for the property rights
movement and for opponents of big government because it dramatizes the
impact of federal regulations on individuals, providing anecdotes of property
owners whose livelihood is, one way or another, threatened by the
government's mandate to save some little-known bird, bug or rodent. In
Texas, for example, 74-year old Margaret Rector lost the chance to build her
retirement home because use of her property would harm the endangered
golden-cheeked warbler.7 For property rights advocates, this is a clear case of
compensable "takings" under the Fifth Amendment, which provides, in
pertinent part, that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation. '
The difficulty for the property rights movement, however, is that while
there are many examples of landowners harmed by the ESA, no court has
recognized a Fifth Amendment taking as a result of an ESA regulation.9
Property rights advocates, therefore, simultaneously advance alternative
positions. On the one hand, they argue that ESA regulations constitute
constitutional takings when private property is affected. On the other hand,
because the courts have not recognized takings claims based on ESA
regulations, the property rights movement advocates legislation which would
expressly declare any reduction in property value as compensable. In this
Article I develop the first of the alternative positions. I will argue that the
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence, by serving as the backdrop against
which environmental regulation is made, does in fact protect landowners from
the ESA. I will demonstrate that the ESA itself contains provisions-the
newly popular section 10 habitat conservation planning (HCP) process, in
particular' 0-which are the practical embodiments of the Fifth Amendment
Margaret Kriz, Aiming for the Green, NAT'L J., Oct. 4, 1997. However, the prospect of ESA
reauthorization does not necessarily negate the potential for a separate compensation bill for landowners.
In fact, Senator Kempthome has separately introduced a landowner-compensation bill that he hopes to
attach to S. 1180 on the Senate floor. See id.
7. See Hearings on Endangered Species Act Habitat Conservation Plans Before the House
Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Congressman Lamar Smith), available in 1996
WL 10829993.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. Some of the staunchest property rights advocates are the first to admit that there has been no
successful regulatory takings claim under the ESA. See, e.g., Robin L. Rivett, Why There Are so Few
Takings Cases Under the Endangered Species Act, or, Some Major Obstacles to Takings Liabilities,
SB14 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 507, 523 (1996). This said, it is important not to confuse a lack of precedents with
the more serious problem of adverse authority: In point of fact, no case has squarely addressed the
propriety of takings challenges to the ESA. Of course environmentalists interpret the absence of such
takings challenges as a clear signal that they are obviously frivolous. While this is one permissible
inference, I will argue that successful takings claims under the ESA are not out of the question, see infra
Part I, and I will offer alternative explanations for why such claims have yet to be litigated on the merits,
see infra Part II.
10. Habitat conservation planning (discussed in more detail infra Subsection I.A.6), provided for
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guarantees. I will show that as the Court has become more willing to find
regulatory takings in recent years, so the ESA has been administered with
increasing sensitivity to its effects on private property. I conclude that the
Interior Department's concern for the ESA's impacts on private landowners is
not only prudent, but required by the Court's current interpretation of the
Takings Clause. Accordingly, the potential for a radical application of the
ESA-one that ignores the dictates of private property-is precluded by the
Court's takings jurisprudence, lessening the need for landowner compensation
legislation.11
B. Questions to be Considered
After briefly introducing the ESA and summarizing the current state of
takings jurisprudence (Part I), I will endeavor to answer three questions: first,
whether regulations pursuant to the ESA may effect regulatory takings (Part
II); second, why there have been no regulatory takings claims under the ESA,
if (as I argue in Part II) such claims are at least legally plausible (Part III); and
third, what influence regulatory takings law has had and should have on
administration of the ESA (Part IV). I will conclude by arguing that only
minor amendments to the ESA are necessary to assure that the Act continues
to be administered with due respect to private property.
The ESA should be considered on its own terms, not as a symbol of the
larger concern over "big government." Newspaper accounts of ruined
landowners notwithstanding, a careful consideration of the ESA and takings
jurisprudence will show that property owners are not left unprotected. As a
practical matter, regulatory takings claims have not been heard under the ESA,
but this is because the Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence silently
in section 10 of the ESA, permits the affected landowner to incidentally "take" (i.e., harm) a listed
species as long as such "taking" is pursuant to an incidental take permit granted by the Secretary of
Interior. In exchange for an incidental take permit, the landowner must agree to a habitat conservation
plan (HCP) that minimizes and mitigates the landowner's impacts on concerned species. See Endangered
Species Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1994). Section 10 (added in 1982) was not part of the original
ESA and has been frequently employed only in the last five years. It is a controversial program,
criticized by property rights advocates and environmentalists alike, since it is absolute neither in its
protection of property nor in its protection of species.
11. I do not mean to suggest that the Court's takings jurisprudence negates all arguments for
landowner compensation legislation. While I have limited my research to takings law in the federal
courts since the ESA is administered by the federal government, commentators have observed that some
state courts are more reluctant to recognize regulatory takings. See, e.g., James S. Burling, Property
Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands and Other Critters: Is It Against Nature To Pay for a Taking? 27
LAND & WATER L. REV. 309, 350-59 (1992). Furthermore, landowner compensation legislation might
be justified on the grounds that even the current takings doctrine is underprotective of property rights.
This view is best stated by Richard A. Epstein who, on Lockean principles, would treat any regulation
affecting private property as a taking subject to the eminent domain clause. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 36 (1985).
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guarantees that the ESA is administered with due regard to property rights.
Indeed, habitat conservation planning (hereinafter "HCP")-an opportunity
for landowners to use their property as they like, as long as they minimize and
mitigate the impacts on concerned species-is available precisely because of
that Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. If HCPs were not available, then
regulatory takings claims would be more common and judicial findings of
compensable takings more likely. While protecting property rights is a worthy
objective, landowners do not require additional protection from the ESA to
receive the level of protection required by current Court precedent: Sufficient
safeguards are already directly provided by the HCP process and indirectly
guaranteed by the Court's interpretation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
I. The Endangered Species Act and Takings Jurisprudence
Prior to exploring the Fifth Amendment takings implications of the ESA,
it is instructive to consider separately the purposes and policies behind these
distinct bodies of law. Indeed, since there are no reported cases involving
takings claims based on ESA regulations, it is necessary that the topics be
introduced separately. This part will elaborate the distinct and sometimes
conflicting purposes of the ESA and the Fifth Amendment: on the one hand,
to protect species wherever found and at whatever cost; on the other hand, to
provide just compensation when private land is taken for a public purpose.
A. The Endangered Species Act
While there is much controversy over what the scope of the ESA should
be,' 2 there is broad agreement as to the breadth of the current Act. In
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,3 for example, the Court, considering the
Act for the first time, described it as "the most comprehensive legislation for
the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation."' 4 The
TVA Court went on to observe that "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting
this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost."' 5 Only three years ago, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
12. The ESA has been up for reauthorization since 1992. Lack of consensus as to how the Act
should be modified-indeed, in some quarters, as to whether the Act should be reauthorized at all-has
resulted in political paralysis on the subject in the last several Congresses. Although it is too early to
know for certain, a bipartisan consensus for reauthorization in 1998 appears within reach. See supra note
6.
13. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
14. Id. at 180.
15. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
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of Communities for a Great Oregon,16 the Court, on its way to upholding the
Secretary of Interior's broad definition of harm (as including habitat
modification or degradation) under the ESA, quoted liberally from TVA as to
the scope of the Act, observing that "[w]hereas predecessor statutes ... had
not contained any sweeping prohibitions against the taking of endangered
species except on federal lands, the 1973 Act applied to all land in the United
States . . ,""7 Indeed, it is the Act's broad mandate-to protect species
wherever found and at whatever cost-which has engendered fear and distrust
among many private landowners.
1. Section 2: ESA Purposes and Policies
In the ESA's introductory section declaring purposes and policies, the
breadth of the Act is foreshadowed: "The purposes of [the ESA] are to provide
a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved . . . ."8 The Act's stated
intention is thus to protect not only species, but ecosystems on which such
species depend. Although environmentalists have frequently criticized the
ESA for not taking an ecosystem approach toward species protection, 9 just
such an approach is contemplated by the express terms of the Act. Particularly
in recent years, the Interior Department and Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)"
have exhibited a strong resolve to protect habitat and ecosystems, invoking the
purposes of the ESA to the fullest extent. Habitat of endangered species is
now expressly protected by an FWS regulation defining harm as, among other
things, "significant habitat modification or degradation.' Indeed, it was the
FWS's broad definition of harm that was recently litigated and upheld in the
Sweet Home decision. Furthermore, current Secretary of Interior Bruce
Babbitt has repeatedly and forcefully advocated an ecosystem approach to
species protection.22 Habitat conservation planning, the primary tool for
ecosystem-based species protection, has increased dramatically in the last five
years.23
16. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
17. Id. at 2413 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
18. Endangered Species Act § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
19. See, e.g., Julie B. Bloch, Preserving Biological Diversity in the United States: The Case for
Moving to an Ecosystems Approach to Protect the Nation's Biological Wealth, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
175 (1992); Jon Welner, Natural Communities Conservation Planning: An Ecosystem Approach to
Protecting Endangered Species, 47 STAN. L. REV. 319 (1995).
20. Respectively, the Interior Department and the Fish and Wildlife Service are the department
and agency responsible for administering the ESA.
21. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1997).
22. See Babbitt, supra note 1. See also Denise Henne, Taking an Ecosystem Approach,
ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL., Jan./Feb. 1995, at 6.
23. Between the 1982 enactment of section 10 (providing for habitat conservation planning) and
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2. Section 3: Protected Species Defined
Ecosystem protection is only triggered by the presence of a concerned
species, so the actual scope of the Act depends on what constitutes a protected
species. Two categories of species are protected under the Act: endangered
species and threatened species. While an endangered species is defined as
"any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range,, 24 a threatened species refers to "any species which is
likely to become [endangered] within the foreseeable future. '25 Moreover, not
only does the Act protect threatened as well as endangered species, the ESA
protects distinct population segments of any such species.26 For example, the
grizzly bear and gray wolf are protected in the continental United States even
though the animals are not threatened or endangered in Alaska.2 Similarly,
distinct populations of the steelhead and coho salmon have been proposed for
listing in many rivers throughout the West.
28
3. Section 4: Species Listing and Habitat Designation Process
The ESA's substantive protections go into effect only once an endangered
or threatened species, or a distinct population thereof, has been formally listed
as such. The Secretary of the Interior makes the determination of whether to
list "solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available. 29
As to the threshold issue of species-listing, the Secretary may not consider any
interest-for example, the effect on private landowners or the impact on jobs
in the local economy-besides that of the species. When the Secretary decides
to list a species, the Secretary must at the same time designate critical habitat
for it." Critical habitat may include not only "areas within the geographical
1994, there were just thirty-nine approved HCPs. In 1995 alone there were forty-five approved HCPs.
See Albert C. Lin, Participants' Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for
Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 372 (1996).
24. Endangered Species Act § 3(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1994). It bears noting that not quite all
endangered species are protected under the ESA. Species of the Class Insecta, determined by the
Secretary to constitute a pest, are specifically excluded from protection. See id.
25. Endangered Species Act § 3(20).
26. See Endangered Species Act § 3(16).
27. See Gary Gerhardt, Saving Threatened Species, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 13, 1997, at
50A.
28. See Elliot Diringer, Protections Urged for Steelhead, S.F. CHRON., Jul. 30, 1996, at Al.
29. Endangered Species Act § 4(b)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1994).
30. See Endangered Species Act § 4(a)(3)(A). In practice, critical habitat is not always designated
at the time a species is listed. In fact, the FWS has discretion in deciding whether and in what amount to
designate critical habitat: habitat is designated "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable."
Endangered Species Act § 4(a)(3). Designation is not prudent when it "would not be beneficial to the
species," 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a) (1997); critical habitat is not determinable when "information [as to the
economic] impacts is lacking" or "biological needs of the species are not sufficiently well known." 50
C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(2) (1997).
Vol. 15:329, 1998
The Endangered Species Act and Fifth Amendment Takings
area occupied by the species," but also lands outside those currently occupied
by the species when such additional habitat is "essential for the conservation
of the species."'" Unlike the decision of whether to list a species, the
Secretary, in deciding to what extent to designate critical habitat, may consider
"the economic impact, and any other relevant impact" of such designation.
32
Listing of a species not only triggers the duty to designate critical habitat,
but also requires the Secretary to issue protective regulations33 and implement
recovery plans for the species.34 As long as a species is listed, it is entitled to
the substantive protections of the Act. A species may be delisted only when it
is found to be no longer threatened or endangered.35 In fact, while more than
fifteen hundred species have been listed since the ESA's enactment, only
eleven species have recovered in the twenty-five year history of the Act.36
4. Section 7: Prevention of Jeopardy from Federal Activity
Under this section, all federal agencies have the affirmative responsibility
to conserve listed species. In practice, this means that each agency must
consult with the FWS to ensure that any action that the agency funds,
authorizes, or carries out does not "jeopardize the continued existence" or
"result in the destruction" or "adverse modification" of the critical habitat of
any protected species.37 Private property interests can be affected by Section 7
in that permits issued by federal agencies (including wetlands fill permits as
well as habitat conservation plans) constitute "actions" subject to the
consultation process and a potential jeopardy finding. The consultation
process begins with an inquiry into whether a protected species is present. The
action agency has 180 days to complete a biological assessment for the
purpose of identifying any endangered or threatened species which might be
affected by the proposed action.38 If such a species is present, a "formal"
consultation is required, and the FWS has ninety days in which to prepare a
biological opinion as to whether the proposed action will jeopardize the
species.39 While the FWS prepares its biological assessment, the acting agency
may not make any "irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources" to
the project.4" If the FWS consultation results in a finding of jeopardy, the FWS
31. Endangered Species Act § 3(5).
32. Endangered Species Act § 4(b)(2).
33. See Endangered Species Act § 4(d).
34. See Endangered Species Act § 4(f).
35. See Endangered Species Act § 4(c)(2).
36. See David Klinger, Federal Act Has Helped Many Species Recover, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Oct. 20, 1997, at E9.
37. See Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
38. See Endangered Species Act § 7(c)(1).
39. See Endangered Species Act § 7(b)(1).
40. See Endangered Species Act § 7(d).
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must suggest those "reasonable and prudent alternatives" pursuant to which
the proposed action could be conducted without jeopardy to the species.4
When a finding of "no jeopardy" is made, the action agency may proceed
with its proposed action without limitation. If, however, the FWS issues a
finding of jeopardy, the action agency, if it is determined to go forward with
its project, is presented with two alternatives. First, the agency may go
forward with its action as long as its taking of species is incidental and in
compliance with the terms and conditions of "the reasonable and prudent
alternatives" mandated by the FWS's biological opinion.4 2 Second, the action
agency, if it is determined not to comply with the FWS's suggested
alternatives, may apply to the Endangered Species Committee, an independent
review board, for an exemption from the section 7 consultation requirements.43
5. Section 9." Prohibited Acts Under the ESA
This provision makes it unlawful for a person or agency to engage in a
number of specific activities involving a listed species. Sweeping in its
application, section 9 applies against federal and nonfederal actors and
protects listed species on both public and private lands. Among the prohibited
acts are the import or export, sale or purchase, or possession of a listed
species, as well as the "taking" of such a species." Section 3(19) of the Act
defines the statutory term "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct."45 In its regulations pursuant to the ESA, the FWS has further
elaborated the concept of "harm" as encompassing "significant habitat
modification or degradation."46 The FWS's expansive interpretation of take or
harm has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Sweet Home.47 As a
consequence of the FWS's broad understanding of "take," many activities not
41. See Endangered Species Act § 7(b)(3)(A).
42. See Endangered Species Act § 7(b)(4). These "reasonable and prudent alternatives" are laid
out in an "incidental take statement," id., not unlike the incidental take permits issued to private
landowners pursuant to section 10 habitat conservation plans. See infra Subsection I.A.6.
43. See Endangered Species Act § 7(g)(1). While an exemption from the requirements of section
7 is perhaps the best possible outcome from the action agency's perspective in that it allows the action
agency to proceed with its project as initially envisioned, applications for such exemptions are quite
infrequent (successful applications rarer still) because the standard for the exemption is very strict and
because five of the seven committee members must approve. See Endangered Species Act § 7(h)(1).
"The process has been invoked only six times and the committee has convened just three times[,]
granting an exemption twice." Rivett, supra note 9, at 517.
44. See Endangered Species Act § 9(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1994).
45. Endangered Species Act § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. 1532(19) (1994) (emphasis added).
46. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c) (1997).
47. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704
(1995).
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intended to affect listed species are nonetheless prohibited to the extent that
they disrupt habitat of such species, in effect, resulting in an "incidental take."
6. Section 10: Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take
Permits
Added to the ESA in 1982, the section 10 HCP process offers to private
landowners the same opportunity that section 7 provides to federal agencies:
the opportunity to carry out a project, the purpose of which is not to harm
listed species, even though the action may result in the incidental taking of
such species. "The Secretary may permit, under terms and conditions as he
shall prescribe ...any taking otherwise prohibited by [section 9] if such
taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise
lawful activity."4 Incidental take permits may be issued to private parties
upon their submission and the Secretary's approval of a conservation plan
(HCP) that specifies: (i) the impacts likely to result from the taking; (ii) steps
the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts; (iii) alternative
actions to such taking that have been considered and why they have not been
utilized; (iv) such other measures as the Secretary may require.4 9 In sum, the
proposed HCP must demonstrate that the applicant will, to the maximum
extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of its incidental taking,
and that the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival of
the species in the wild."
7. Overview of the ESA
An analysis of the specific provisions of the ESA thus reveals a statute
that is sweeping in its protection of endangered or threatened species. By
embracing a broad definition of "species" as including subspecies and distinct
population segments of a given species, the Act takes a maximalist approach
toward species protection." These species, in turn, are protected against
everyone-federal agencies as well as private landowners-and wherever
found-on private as well as on public lands. Moreover, species are preserved
48. Endangered Species Act § I0(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(B) (1994).
49. See Endangered Species Act § 10(a)(2)(A).
50. See Endangered Species Act § I 0(a)(1)(A).
51. Why protect subspecies and distinct populations instead of drawing the line at species? The
concept of subspecies is the subject of much uncertainty and debate within the scientific community.
Biodiversity expert Edward 0. Wilson concedes that "[tihe classification [of subspecies] works so long
as we recognize that dicing up the whole species geographically is imprecise and to a large degree
arbitrary. Depending on the criteria used, there could be one subspecies of [a given species] or there
could be hundreds." EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 66 (1992). Given the background
uncertainty in the science of subspecies, it is clear that the authors of the ESA chose to err on the side of
maximum species protection.
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indirectly as well as directly, as demonstrated by the provision for designation
of critical habitat (which may include habitat even beyond the actual range of
the concerned species) and the prohibition on habitat modification or
degradation. Finally, it is not only the pervasiveness of ESA protections, but
also their duration that is remarkable. In light of the fact that less than one
percent of listed species have actually recovered since the Act's inception
nearly twenty-five years ago, 52 the ESA's mandate to protect species until
recovered effectively results in indefinite regulatory protection.
In summary, given the broad scope of the ESA's regulatory mandate, it
should not be surprising that private property is frequently and significantly
affected. However, while the ESA's authors were primarily motivated by
species protection, the ESA is not single-minded in its pursuit of species
protection. Whereas the listing decision must be based solely on the best
scientific and commercial data, the decision to designate critical habitat must
be made with reference to the economic impact of such designation;
moreover, the Act's prohibition on the taking of species is not absolute, since
incidental taking by agencies or private actors may be allowed as long as
efforts are made to minimize and mitigate the impacts of such actions. Indeed,
the various provisions of the ESA that consider, and to some extent mitigate,
the impact of regulations on landowners, should perhaps be viewed as a
recognition of the constitutional limits of environmental regulation: to wit, the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
B. Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence
The text of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is deceptively
simple and apparently clear: "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."53 Indeed, there are many easy takings cases.54
52. See Klinger, supra note 36, at E9.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
54. Twenty years ago, the concept of regulatory takings was all but forgotten. By contrast, it has
been one of the most rapidly evolving areas of law in the 1980s and 1990s. As one commentator recently
observed, "[a]cademic mulling over the matter has generated an unsurprisingly large accumulation of
'solutions' to or 'theories' about the problem." James E. Krier, Takings From Freund to Fisehel, 84
GEO. L.J. 1895, 1895 (1996). For classic articles on takings, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV.
1165, 1224-25 (1967) (viewing "demoralization costs" of property taken without compensation as the
principal evil the Takings Clause is designed to address); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36, 61-63 (1964) (distinguishing between cases in which the state acts in its own self-
interest and those in which it acts as an arbitrator among private interests, and finding takings in the
former, but not the latter cases). More recent comprehensive analyses have been undertaken by RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 35-106, 161-330
(1985) (asserting that all regulation is a taking subject to Fifth Amendment analysis, but that
compensation is not always required by the Just Compensation Clause) and WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 289-324 (1995) (asserting that the role of the
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For example, it is uncontroversial that if the government decides to build a
highway across your property, you are entitled to compensation-the
government must pay.5 Similarly, if the government appropriates a private
business for public use, the government must also pay. 6 For that matter, even
the seemingly trivial government-authorized placement of cable television
connection boxes on the roof of an apartment building has been held to
constitute a taking. 7 In each of these cases, a taking is found because there is
an appropriation or physical invasion of property. This is the traditional
physical occupation theory of Fifth Amendment takings: The government's
physical occupation of private property, no matter how small, effects a taking.
1. Origins of Regulatory Takings Law
Takings law, however, loses its clarity when the challenged government
action is regulatory, rather than physical, in nature. The idea of regulatory
takings dates to Justice Holmes's opinion in the 1922 case of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon." At issue in Mahon was whether the Kohler Act-a
Pennsylvania law forbidding the mining of coal in such a way as to cause the
subsidence of human habitation-effected a constitutional taking of Penn
Coal's property rights in subsurface mining. 9 On his way to finding a
compensable taking, Justice Holmes announced the oft-quoted principle
behind regulatory takings: "The general rule at least is that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."6 Though Holmes was concerned by the prospect of
"regulation going too far," he nonetheless made clear that it is impractical for
government to pay every time a law affects property: "Government hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."61
Finally, Justice Holmes did not attempt to provide a bright line for what is
courts is to police the political process to ensure that citizens have either "voice" or "exit"; when neither
exists, compensation should be paid). A reconciliation or novel understanding of this area of law is
beyond the scope of this project. My aim is to describe, with an eye toward the implications for ESA
regulations that affect private property, and to identify those issues in the law that are still unresolved.
55. See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the
paradigmatic cases of compensable takings).
56. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1946) (holding that the federal
govemment's appropriation of a privately owned laundry for use during World War II was a taking).
57. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
58. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
59. See id. at 412.
60. Id. at 415.
61. Id. at413.
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"too far:" It was, rather, "a question of degree-and therefore cannot be
disposed of by general propositions. 62
For more than half a century following Mahon, the Court was silent as to
the possibility of regulatory takings, in effect limiting Fifth Amendment
compensation to cases of physical invasion or appropriation. It was not until
the late 1970s and early 1980s that the concept of regulatory takings was
revived. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan provided the logical leap
from traditional physical takings doctrine to the modem regulatory takings
idea:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-
use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in
order to promote the public good just as effectively as formal
condemnation or physical invasion of property. From the property
owner's point of view, it may matter little whether his land is
condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by regulation to use
in its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to deprive him of all
beneficial use of it.6
3
For Brennan, while the character of the governmental action might be relevant
to the takings inquiry, the touchstone of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is the
effect of governmental action on the property owner.' Simply put, property
interests can be harmed equally as much by regulation as by physical invasion
or appropriation.
2. The Rebirth of Regulatory Takings: The Penn Central Case
While in the last two decades the Court has consistently recognized the
possibility of regulatory takings, there is no unified doctrine. Indeed, the Court
itself has frequently acknowledged the difficult and ad hoc nature of the
takings question: "The question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of
62. Id. at 416.
63. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
64. In his disqent in San Diego Gas, Brennan is above all concerned with the effect (rather than
the nature) of governmental action on the property owner: "if the effect in both cases is to deprive him of
all beneficial use" then there is a taking. Id. It should be noted, however, that "effect on the landowner"
is only one-third of the three-fold inquiry Brennan had announced just three years earlier in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (holding that takings analysis
depends on (i) the character of the governmental action, (ii) economic impact of regulation, and (iii)
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations). Brennan's emphasis, in San Diego Gas,
on the economic impact on the landowner to the exclusion of other factors (such as the nature of the
governmental action), foreshadows the concept of per se regulatory takings (where the landowner is
deprived of all economic value) developed in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1014-19 (1992).
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the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty...
• [T]his Court, quite simply has been unable to develop any 'set formula' ...
.65 The Court thus concedes that "whether a particular restriction will be
rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately
caused by it depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that]
case."'
66
Notwithstanding the Court's characterization of the takings issue as a
fact-sensitive inquiry, the Court, at various times over the last twenty years,
has announced several tests to determine whether a taking has occurred. While
each of the tests will be separately addressed in the next section, it is
instructive to begin the analysis by reviewing the Court's decision in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.67 Penn Central is important,
not only because it is the first time since Mahon that the Court considered the
possibility of a regulatory taking, but also because it provides the foundation
from which regulatory takings analysis has evolved over the last two decades.
At issue in Penn Central was whether the City of New York-or more
specifically, the City's Landmarks Preservation Committee-had effected a
taking by denying, pursuant to its historic landmarks law, Penn Central's
application to construct a high rise office tower above the train station. The
Court found that no taking had occurred. The Court cited several factors in
support of its holding. First, owners could not establish a taking merely by
showing that they had been denied the right to exploit their airspace,
irrespective of the remainder of the parcel.6" Second, the mere fact that some
owners are more seriously affected than others does not necessarily result in a
taking. Third, there is no taking because the law did not interfere with the
owner's present use or prevent it from realizing a reasonable rate of return on
its investment. The Court, in rejecting the plaintiffs' takings claim, relied
particularly on the fact that Penn Central was to some extent compensated, in
the form of transferable development rights, for not being able to build its
high rise.69
65. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24.
66. Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
67. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
68. This is the earliest modem expression of the so-called "parcel as a whole" rule. For a
thorough review of cases considering this rule, see John M. Groen, The Relevant Parcel Issue, C872
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 167 (1993) (stressing the need for a case-by-case analysis to determine the relevant parcel
for purposes of the regulatory takings inquiry).
69. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137. Transferable development rights (TDRs) are granted to
property owners in a "preservation" area in exchange for their forgoing development in that area. TDRs
are valuable in that they may be used in "growth" areas to permit development beyond that which would
be allowed under the existing zoning regulations. TDRs may be used by the landowner to whom they are
originally granted (if that landowner has property in a growth area that it seeks to develop further) or
may be sold on the market to other parties. For a more in-depth discussion of how TDRs work, including
case studies of two TDR programs, see James T. B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines
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Penn Central, however, is less known for its holding than for its
identification of three factors that are relevant to the inquiry of whether a
regulatory taking has occurred: the character of the governmental action,70 the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.7 It is
from these three factors that subsequent regulatory takings tests have been
drawn. While Penn Central, at first blush, may seem to provide a workable,
common-sense approach to resolving regulatory takings challenges, in
practice the decision adds little certainty to the takings inquiry because the
Penn Central factors are not self-defining.
Does the "nature of governmental action" factor refer to the physicalness
of the intrusion-that is, the more the action is like a physical invasion, the
more likely it is to be considered a taking?72 Or is it about whether the action
is pursuant to a legitimate public purpose within the traditional police
power? 3 Or is it, instead, concerned with whether there is a nexus between the
landowner-caused harm sought to be prevented and the regulatory action or
requirement?74
How should the "economic impact" factor be measured? Is the impact to
be compared to the entire property as a whole 5 or only to the section of
property affected by the regulatory action?76 If a property owner is deprived of
all economic value, does this in itself result in a taking? 77
for Designing Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369 (1989).
70. According to the Court, a .'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."
Penn Central, 138 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted). Thus, at least for the Penn Central Court, the
governmental action factor, in effect, simply reflects the origins of Fifth Amendment takings law: that
physical invasions are the paradigmatic taking.
71. See id.
72. This appears to have been the intention of the Penn Central Court. See supra note 70; see
also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (finding a taking based on
the government's authorization of the placement of cable box connectors on a privately-owned
apartment building). In subsequent takings cases, however, the nature of the governmental action factor
has seemingly acquired a significance independent of the act's "physicalness." See, e.g., Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (finding a taking because of a lack of nexus between
the governmental action and the harm to be prevented); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Benedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987) (nature of the governmental action inquiry focused on the legitimate public purpose
behind the action).
73. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The application of a general
zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests .... ").
74. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-37.
75. The Penn Central Court made it clear that it was the "extent of the interference with rights in
the parcel as a whole" that was the relevant inquiry. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. Although
subsequent decisions have not rejected this statement, the so-called "parcel as a whole" rule has not
always been followed. See cases cited infra note 105.
76. While courts consistently acknowledge the parcel as a whole rule, in practice it is not always
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What is meant by the landowner's reasonable,7" investment-backed
expectations? What property owner's expectations are "reasonable?" Is there
an objective standard for reasonable expectations, such as expectations (as to
permissible activities) that do not offend principles of state nuisance law?79 Or
is what constitutes a reasonable expectation simply whatever the court decides
is consistent with the common good of society-a sort of reasonable person's
idea of reasonable expectations?"0
Finally, the Court provides little guidance as to how the factors should be
considered in relation to each other. May any single one of them be decisive?
If a consideration of the factors leads to opposite conclusions, which is
controlling? Or if none controls, is it the best two out of three?
Manifestly, the Penn Central factors raise more questions than they
answer--questions that the Court has struggled to resolve (with limited
success) in its repeated reformulations of the takings inquiry.
3. Uncertainty in Regulatory Takings: Competing Analyses
Although the Court, in the last two decades, has not directly criticized or
disavowed the three-factor Penn Central test, it has declined to apply the Penn
Central test in the context of many regulatory takings challenges. Instead, the
Court has, on various occasions, used other criteria-or perhaps, similar
criteria, but under different labels-to decide regulatory takings cases. It
decisive. For example, a court solicitous of property owners might take the position of the Claims Court
which, after acknowledging the validity of the parcel as a whole rule, decided that "[i]n this case,
however, the critical issue is how to define what the whole parcel includes." Loveladies Harbor v.
United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 391 (1988) (deciding that the relevant parcel-against which the economic
impact is measured-was the 12.5 acres for which a permit to fill wetlands was denied, not the
landowner's original holding of 250 acres).
77. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992), the Court found
a per se taking because the property owner had been deprived of all economic value. With Lucas, thus,
originates the idea of a per se or categorical regulatory taking. There is not, however, any indication in
Penn Central that a deprivation of all economic value would automatically result in a taking-it is, after
all, just one of three Penn Central factors.
78. Although the Court, in Penn Central, used the phrase "distinct investment-backed
expectations," Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, it has since generally referred to "reasonable, investment-
backed expectations." See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
79. Lucas is notable for two reasons: first, for its analysis of per se regulatory takings when all
economic value is deprived; and second, for its limiting of the police power exemption from takings to
the bounds of a state's property and nuisance law.
80. This view is perhaps embodied in the idea of "average reciprocity of advantage"--that is, a
regulation of general application, "designed to promote the common good," does not effect a taking even
if some landowners are incidentally harmed and suffer a diminution in value, since it is presumed that
these owners at the same time receive some benefit (even if in a given case, they are more harmed than
benefited), to the extent they share in the common good. Zoning regulations are the classic example of
mutual reciprocity of advantage. See Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding the
prohibition of industrial use of land).
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comes as little surprise, then, given the uncertainty of regulatory takings law
and the resultant multiplicity of available takings tests, that the Court's recent
takings jurisprudence has spawned a large amount of commentary. Professor
Andrea Peterson, a critic of "the chaotic state of current Takings Clause
doctrine," 81 identifies four separate takings standards: the three-factor Penn
Central test, the two-part Agins test, the "no economically viable use" test of
Lucas, and the Loretto per se rule.82 In addition to the four tests Peterson
alludes to, at least one other should be considered: the substantial nexus test of
Nollan. What follows is a summary review of the various takings analyses
employed by the Court since Penn Central.
In Agins v. City of Tiburon 3, just two years after Penn Central, the Court
created a new, two-part takings inquiry: first, whether the regulation
substantially advances a legitimate state purpose; and second, whether the
owner is denied economically viable use of his land. 4 In Agins, the plaintiff-
landowner, a residential developer, challenged a zoning ordinance limiting the
density of residential development. Although the Agins Court formulated its
own takings analysis rather than simply relying on the Penn Central factors,
the Court arrived at a similar result, denying the takings claim.85 Agins
nonetheless represents a departure from Penn Central in two respects. First,
whereas in Penn Central, the "nature of governmental action" factor pertains
to the "physicalness" of the action or regulation, the Agins "legitimate state
interest" test focuses on whether the government has a valid reason for its
actions, or more narrowly, on whether the government is preventing nuisance-
like conduct.86 Second, whereas the Penn Central Court gives little guidance
on how the factors are to be considered, the Court in Agins, declares that a
taking occurs if either of the conditions-lack of legitimate state interest or
denial of all economic use-is met.87
Two years after Agins and four years after Penn Central, the Court
decided Loretto, finding that the government's authorization of the placement
of cable television connectors on privately-owned apartment buildings
constituted a taking. The Court's analysis in Loretto is quite distinct from
Penn Central or Agins: rather than employing a multi-prong test, the Loretto
81. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I-A
Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1299, 1305 (1989).
82. Seeid. at 1316.
83. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
84. See id. at 260.
85. See id. at 260-63.
86. See Peterson, supra note 81, at 1327-28.
87. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. For an extended discussion of whether the takings test in Agins
should be read in the conjunctive or disjunctive, see Robert K. Best, All Dressed Up But Where Do We
Go?, C997 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 223, 229-30 (1995) (concluding that a taking occurs if either circumstance is
met).
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Court finds a per se taking based on the government-authorized physical
invasion."8
Yet another innovation in regulatory takings analysis was provided by the
Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 9 In Nollan, the
California Coastal Commission, acting under the authority of the California
Coastal Act, prohibited the Nollan family from building a residence on their
beachfront property unless they granted an easement allowing the public to
walk along the beach across their land. Nollan is thus unlike Penn Central and
Agins where development was flatly denied; the Nollans' exercise of their
property rights was not prohibited but made conditional. The Court began its
analysis by noting that, while outright appropriation of a public-access
easement would amount to a taking, requiring such an easement as a building
permit condition did not necessarily effect a taking.9" Indeed, had the Court
considered the Nollan case in light of the Penn Central factors, perhaps no
taking would have been found since the Nollans were deprived of far less than
all economic value and since they did not have a reasonable expectation that
their land would be free from regulation, including building permit
conditions.91
Nollan, however, turned on the nature of the governmental action-but
not in the sense that Penn Central (physicalness of the action) or Agins
(legitimacy of the state interest) understood the phrase. For the Nollan Court,
the permit condition effected a taking because it lacked an adequate "nexus"
with the harm the state sought to prevent. The Commission's permit
condition-a public-access easement-was not closely related to the harm-
blocking the public's view of the beach-caused by the owner's proposed
action.92 Thus, in the context of permit conditions, Nollan, in effect,
establishes a presumption of takings, rebuttable only by showing a nexus
between the alleged harm and the permit condition.93
88. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
89. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
90. See id. at 834-36.
91. The Nollans exercised their option to buy the subject property (on the condition that they
would demolish the existing bungalow and replace it with a three-story home) even after they had
applied for a building permit and were told they would be required to grant an easement. See id. at 828.
92. See Nolan, 483 U.S. 838-39.
93. Indeed, the importance and weight of the apparent presumption that permit conditions effect
takings has been borne out in subsequent decisions. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), the
Court agreed with the city that there was a nexus between a landowner's contemplated harm-increased
commercial development which would lead to increased traffic-and the permit condition-creation of a
dedicated bike path on the property-but still found a taking because the city's findings as to the
reasonable relation between the harm and the permit condition (i.e., that the additional number of vehicle
trips generated by commercial development would be offset by the use of the bike path) were
inadequate. The Court announced a "rough proportionality" requirement between the permit condition
and the subject harm. See id. at 391; see also Marshall S. Sprung, Taking Sides: The Burden of Proof
Switch in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1301 (1996) (demonstrating how the burden of
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In 1992 the Court decided Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,94 its
most recent and significant regulatory takings case. Instead of clarifying the
various takings tests announced in the previous decade and a half, however,
the Court created a new takings standard and questioned (but did not resolve)
the premises of earlier decisions. At issue in Lucas was a developer's
challenge to a South Carolina law95 prohibiting the development of certain
beachfront property in order to prevent beach erosion. All of Lucas's land was
within the newly protected zone. Although the Court did not itself find a
taking, instead remanding the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court,96 the
majority nevertheless seized the opportunity to articulate a new takings
standard: that a taking is effected when all economic value is deprived-in
effect, a per se regulatory taking.97
While Lucas is most often associated with its ruling that a deprivation of
all value constitutes a taking, it is the case's holding on two subsidiary issues
that is perhaps most innovative.98 First, the Lucas decision seriously narrows
the nuisance exception to takings, and in so doing, adds substance to the
notion of a property owner's reasonable expectations.99 Also known as the
"noxious use" doctrine, the nuisance or police power exception allows the
taking of property without compensation when the act or regulation is aimed
at preventing harm rather than procuring a benefit. Whereas prior to Lucas the
government could readily avoid takings liability by invoking the police
power,'°° the Lucas decision requires that the regulation be consistent with
"background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already
placed upon land ownership."'0 ' By adopting a historically confined definition
of nuisance, 10 2 Lucas effectively limits the nuisance exception to harms that
proof can be determinative in the takings context).
94. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
95. The Beachfront Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(A)(2) (1997).
96. The Court remanded to the South Carolina Supreme Court to determine whether state
common law had already proscribed Lucas's intended uses. The Court hinted, however, that a taking
should probably be found, observing that "[i]t seems unlikely that common law principles would have
prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on [Lucas's] land." Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1031.
97. See id.at 1019.
98. Indeed, the Lucas rule that a deprivation of all economic value effects a per se taking is not
especially novel. Deprivation of economic value is among the Penn Central factors and deprivation of
all economic value is the second half of the Agins test.
99. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
100. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), for example, no taking was found as a
consequence of the dramshops being put out of business by statewide prohibition. See also Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (regulation prohibiting brickyards within city limits was part of police
power and thus no taking occurred).
101. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
102. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993) (criticizing Lucas's freezing of property
and nuisance law in the common law past, and thus making ecological regulation difficult and costly).
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would have been actionable at common law. In other words, "new" harms 0 3
may be regulated only as long as the government pays compensation for
deprivation of economic value.
The second way in which Lucas departs from prior takings jurisprudence
occurs almost as an aside. Responding to Justice Stevens' dissenting criticism
of the deprivation-of-all-economic-use rule as arbitrary,' °4 the Court calls into
question the Penn Central "parcel as a whole" rule"°5 and raises the possibility
of "partial takings." Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia observes that the
dissent "errs in its assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one
step short of complete is not entitled to compensation."'0 6 The Court's view of
deprivation of all, or nearly all, value as a per se taking, when juxtaposed
against the "parcel as a whole" rule, highlights a tension underlying regulatory
takings law. If the Court were really serious in requiring all economic value to
be deprived prior to finding a taking, very few such takings would be
recognized. By asserting, however, that a landowner whose deprivation is less
than complete may be entitled to compensation, the Court has opened the door
to allegations of partial takings0 7 and has cast doubt on the traditional
regulatory takings proposition that mere diminution in value does not
constitute a taking.10
8
4. Summary: A Few Settled Principles of Regulatory Takings Law
In summary, while the Court's opinion in Penn Central broke ground by
laying a framework in which to think about regulatory takings, it has been the
Court's more recent decisions in Lucas and Nollan that have added substance
103. Ecological harms, for example, might constitute "new" harms as to which the nuisance
exception to takings liability would not apply. See id.
104. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens J., dissenting) ("A landowner whose property is
diminished in value 95% recovers nothing, while an owner whose property is diminished 100% recovers
the land's full value.").
105. While the Court has since affirmed the "parcel as a whole" rule in Concrete Pipe &
Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 642-44 (1993), the
rule has not been consistently applied by the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus. v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (recognizing the possibility of a partial taking and
remanding to Claims Court for balancing of competing interests); Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d
1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding compensable taking where an owner had lost 77% of the value of a flock
of turkeys due to a federal government quarantine).
106. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
107. "The question remains, does a partial deprivation resulting from a regulatory imposition,
that is, a situation in which a regulation deprives the owner of a substantial part but not essentially all of
the economic use or value of the property, constitute a partial taking, and is it compensable as such?...
The Court's decisions to date have not provided an answer." Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568. The court
went on to find that not all economic value had been deprived, and that therefore the case should be
remanded to the lower court to see if a taking had nonetheless occurred. See id. at 1572-73.
108. See, e.g., Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in value
caused by zoning law did not effect a taking).
Yale Journal on Regulation
to the Penn Central factors.'09 Although regulatory takings law has been in a
state of flux for the better part of the last two decades, there are nonetheless
several settled principles. First, a regulation that does not substantially
advance a state interest, or that in the context of permit conditions does not do
so in a way that is closely related to the harm to be prevented, effects a taking.
Second, a deprivation of all or nearly all economic value automatically
triggers Fifth Amendment compensation (while in a case where less than all
value is deprived, the economic impact of the regulation is just one among
several factors-such as state interest in the action and expectations of
owners-to be balanced). Third, the police power exception to takings
liability is limited to prevention of harms cognizable under the common law
background principles of nuisance or property.
II. The Potential for Takings Effected by the ESA
Having outlined the broad scope of the ESA and having considered the
recent revitalization and strengthening of the regulatory takings doctrine, the
question is ready to be posed: May the ESA effect regulatory takings?" 0
A. Regulatory Takings Doctrine Applied to ESA Regulations
As a preliminary matter, it should be observed that the following analysis
is concerned with ESA regulations (for example, the listing of an endangered
species or the designation of critical habitat) and not with other non-regulatory
or physical actions carried out pursuant to the Act. While such other actions
may also occasion takings,"' they would be analyzed under the more
109. This is, of course, not to say that Nollan and Lucas have resolved all questions or doubts
about regulatory takings law. Indeed, in some respects they have raised as many questions as they have
answered, for example, whether partial takings are compensable and what role the "parcel as a whole"
rule plays in the doctrine.
110. A more straightforward question would of course be, Does the ESA effect takings? The
answer is no-at least, there is at present no record of takings claims having been litigated under the
ESA. (Indeed, why takings cases have not been litigated under the ESA is the focus of the next part.)
However, the mere absence of suits does not mean that any such claim is meritless as a matter of law.
The dearth of takings claims under the ESA may be a function of several circumstances: Perhaps, for
example, it is because of the way the Act is administered-that is, by avoiding direct, all-or-nothing
conflicts with property owners-that in most circumstances, takings claims under the ESA are at once
not worth bringing and not justified on the merits. See infra Part III. While the mere lack of takings suits
under the ESA does not negate the possibility of such suits, it does make the ESA takings analysis
largely conjectural. Absent the concrete details of actual cases, the analysis must inevitably depend on an
application of general propositions to imaginable but hypothetical factual contexts.
11. See, e.g., Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Christy v.
Lujan 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). In Christy, the Ninth Circuit denied compensation to a sheep rancher
when-because of the section 9 prohibitions on harming listed species he was powerless to prevent
protected grizzly bears from devouring 20 of his sheep. Justice White, dissenting from the denial of
certiorari, appeared sympathetic to the rancher's takings claim: "There can be little doubt that if a federal
statute authorized park rangers to come around at night and take petitioner's livestock to feed the bears,
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traditional rubric of takings by physical invasion or appropriation." 2 In any
event, it is generally ESA regulation of private property that engenders the
most controversy-as well as the loudest calls for congressional reform-and
that is, therefore, the primary focus of this part.
Since it is regulation pursuant to the ESA that most commonly affects
private property, it is the Court's regulatory takings doctrine that is
implicated: How do ESA regulations-to wit, listing of species and
designation of critical habitat-fare in view of the regulatory takings factors
announced in Penn Central and elaborated in subsequent jurisprudence?
1. The Nature of the Governmental Action
In the case of either a species listing or a designation of critical habitat,
application of the governmental action factor suggests that a taking would not
result. Whether analyzed in terms of the physicalness of the regulation (as in
Penn Central) or in terms of whether the regulation substantially advances a
legitimate state interest (as in Agins), the "nature of the governmental action"
factor militates against finding a taking.'
First, neither the listing of a species nor the designation of habitat is
readily amenable to being characterized as a physical invasion. These
regulatory actions do not, for example, authorize the placement of a thing into
or on top of private property as in Loretto."' At most, it might be argued that
species listing or habitat designation legally recognizes a species's physical
occupation of private land. This hardly rises to the level of a government-
backed physical invasion, however, since the endangered species may occupy
private land irrespective of government protection."15 Moreover, while takings
case law is scarce under the ESA, the possibility of a physical taking pursuant
such governmental action would constitute a 'taking' .... For similar reasons the [ESA] may be suspect
as applied in [petitioner's] case." Christy, 490 U.S. at 115-16. Note that although White compared it to a
physical taking, the case could be analyzed as a regulatory taking based on the effect of the section 9
prohibition.
112. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
113. Note that the Nollan test (whether there is an adequate nexus between the regulatory
requirements and the harm to be prevented) is not applicable in the context of species listing or habitat
designation decisions, without more. However, as discussed infra Subsection IV.B.3, the Nollan nexus
requirement is not entirely irrelevant to the ESA, and in fact may hold important implications for habitat
conservation plans.
114. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
115. A landowner might be able to make a colorable argument for a physical taking when the
government actually introduces a population of animals on or around her land. Just such an argument
was rejected, however, by a California court in Moerman v. California, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993). In Moerman, plaintiff-landowner alleged the state had damaged his property by relocating
tule elk that destroyed his fences and ate forage intended for his livestock. The court found that "tule elk
are not instrumentalities of the state nor controlled by the state," and that therefore, there had been no
physical taking. Id. at 334.
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to ESA regulation has been considered and rejected in Christy v. Hodel."6 In
Christy, the Ninth Circuit, disagreeing with the assertion that the ESA turned
grizzly bears into government agents, rejected a rancher's claim that the
government was responsible for the acts of grizzly bears (a protected species
in the lower forty-eight states) in devouring his sheep.17
Second, not only does the ESA fail to work anything like a physical
invasion, actions pursuant to the Act are almost certainly justified under Agins
as substantially advancing a legitimate state interest. In practice, a legitimate
state interest can almost always be found to support a regulation, since the
Court is extremely deferential to the legislative purposes and findings of duly-
enacted statutes."' Among the sorts of state interests recognized by courts as
legitimate-despite their effect on private property-are zoning,] 19 historic
preservation,2 0  flood plain regulation,'2 ' and wetlands protection.
22
Moreover, the Court has already approved the legitimacy and importance of
the public interest embodied in the ESA-"the most comprehensive
legislation for the preservation of endangered species"'3-as "support[ing]
the permissibility of the Secretary's [definition of harm] regulation."'2 " There
is thus little doubt that in the takings context, a court would find that
regulations pursuant to ESA advance a legitimate state interest.
2. Economic Impact of the Regulation: A Hypothetical Illustration
While it is fairly clear that the governmental action factor points toward
the ESA's not effecting takings, it is much less clear whether the economic
impact factor argues for or against an ESA-caused taking. Indeed, whereas in
116. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Christy v. Lujan,
490 U.S. 1114 (1989); see also Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir.
1986) (holding that damage to private property caused by federally protected wild burros did not
constitute a taking). It should be noted that Justice White, dissenting from the Court's denial of certiorari
in Christy, was at least sympathetic to the rancher's arguments. See Christy, 490 U.S. at 1115-16.
117. See Christy, 857 F.2d at 1335.
118. See, e.g., Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("If the validity of the
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be
allowed to control."). Emblematic of the deference recent courts typically accord to legislative
judgments of public interest is the finding of the Court of Claims in Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657
F.2d 1184 (1981), that wetlands preservation is a legitimate state interest: "In this case we take as given.
. that the regulations ... and the entire body of federal navigational and environmental laws to which
they give effect, substantially advance legitimate and important federal interests." Id. at 1192 (emphasis
added).
119. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
120. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
121. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994).
122. See Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1192.
123. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
124. Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 689
(1995).
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any given case an ESA regulation will likely be found to advance a state
interest, such generalization is not possible with respect to the economic
impact factor. Depending upon the particular facts of each case, the economic
impact factor may work for or against the finding of a taking. For the barely
affected landowner, application of this factor will militate against and almost
surely preclude the possibility of a taking; for a substantially affected
landowner, the economic impact factor may point toward a taking, but not
conclusively so; for the landowner whose economic value is entirely
dissipated, this factor will be determinative of a taking.
Since the economic impact of an ESA regulation depends upon the
specific facts of a given case, it is instructive to evaluate the impact of a
species's listing or habitat designation on several hypothetical landowners.
Imagine a rural county that is home to a dwindling population of "rarebird," a
species of bird that nests only in trees on the banks of Rarebird Creek. Private
land in the county is held by just four separate owners: Acme Lumber, which
owns timberland throughout the county (500 acres, including 100 acres in the
creek basin); Larry Logger, who runs a tree farm that straddles a portion of
Rarebird Creek (50 acres, one half of which are in the creek basin); Larry's
sister, Lonnie Logger, who owns timber in the rugged and remote upper
reaches of the creek basin (50 acres, all in the 'creek basin); and Holly
Homeowner, who owns a house overlooking the creek and adjacent to Larry
Logger (5 acres). Acme, Larry, Lonnie, and Holly each plan to cut down trees
in the near future: Acme, Larry, and Lonnie as part of their business, and
Holly to get an unobstructed view of the nearby creek. Suppose now that the
FWS decides to list the rarebird as endangered and designate the Rarebird
Creek basin as critical habitat for the bird. Such an action would effectively
prohibit the cutting of trees in the Rarebird Creek basin, since FWS
regulations forbid the taking (harming) of listed species, including "significant
habitat modification where it . injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding."' 25 What would a court find
to be the economic impact of these regulations'26 on the respective
landowners?
125. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1997).
126. The takings implications of habitat designation need not be analyzed separately because
critical habitat designation does not actually increase a species's protection on private land beyond what
is already provided by listing the species. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed. Reg. 1796 (1992) (codified at
C.F.R. pt. 17). Formally, the only added legal protection provided by habitat designation pertains to
federal lands: "[A]ny action authorized, funded, or carried out by [a federal] agency [must] not
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary...
to be critical." Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. 1336(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added). It
should, however, be noted that a critical habitat designation may, as a practical matter, more effectively
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The economic impact analysis involves a comparison of the property's
pre-regulation value to its post-regulation value. Consequently, the first and
perhaps most important issue in the analysis has to do with what the relevant
pre-regulation property is. Is it only the land affected by the regulation-that
is, land on which the rarebird is actually found? Or is it, instead, the property
owner's entire holding? While a handful of recent decisions have injected an
element of uncertainty into the issue, 2 7 courts are nevertheless most likely to
follow Penn Central's "parcel as a whole" rule.22 As a result, only a modest
economic impact on Acme Lumber would be found (since only 100 of its 500
acres are affected by regulation), and thus, given that ESA regulation
advances a legitimate state interest,2 9 Acme's takings claim would be
unsuccessful. For Holly Homeowner and Lonnie Logger, on the other hand,
the "parcel as a whole" rule would not present an obstacle to a takings claim
since every acre of their respective properties is affected. Finally, as to Larry
Logger, the "parcel as a whole" rule would diminish, but perhaps not entirely
negate, his takings claim. While case law suggests that a landowner for whom
less than half of the property is affected is not entitled to compensation, 30
there is no bright line separating a mere diminution in value from a
compensable taking. Whether Larry is entitled to compensation would depend
on a further inquiry into the severity of the economic impact (i.e., what
reasonable uses might remain on the affected portion of property) and a
balancing of this impact, along with the effect on his reasonable, investment-
backed expectations, against the public interest behind the regulation.
The second issue in the economic impact analysis concerns the severity of
the regulation's effect on the property: that is, whether the regulation denies
protect species on private land since designation "helps focus conservation activities . . . alerting the
public to the importance of an area in the conservation of a listed species." Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed. Reg. at
1796. Activities of private owners of critical habitat will be subject to close scrutiny (to make sure no
section 9 prohibited taking occurs), and consequently, a Fifth Amendment takings claim may be more
likely as a practical matter.
127. See supra note 76.
128. See supra note 75.
129. See supra Subsection II.A.I.
130. In one of the few cases-state or federal-where a court considered the merits of a
regulatory takings challenge to a species protection regulation, Florida Game and Freshwater Fish
Comm'n v. Flotilla, 636 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), the court found no taking since
development was restricted (for protection of bald eagle nesting sites under the Bald Eagle Protection
Act) on only 48 acres of plaintiffs 173-acre parcel. The court explained that "Flotilla retained the
desired use of a majority of its land." Id. at 765. For similar results in the more-frequently-litigated
wetlands preservation context, see, e.g., Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 35 Fed. CI.
232 (1996) (developer's loss of 12 out of 27 lots as a result of a wetlands protection order of the Army
Corps of Engineers was a diminution in value, not a taking); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310
(1991) (no taking when only 14 of plaintiff's 48 acres were affected by a wetlands fill permit denial);
Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (no taking when fill permit denial was
applicable to only 20% of plaintiff's total land and 33% of the developable lots).
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economically viable use.' 3' If the regulation is found to deny all economic use,
then a per se taking is effected;' 32 if less than all value is deprived, then the
extent of the deprivation, as well as the interference with the owner's
reasonable expectations,'33 is balanced against the public interest served.'34
While the foregoing rules are plain and simple in the abstract, they are
troublesome in their application. What constitutes "all" economic use and
hence a per se regulatory taking is far from clear. First, it should be noted that
"all" does not necessarily mean 100%. For example, the Lucas Court-the
Court responsible for the concept of per se regulatory takings-suggests that a
deprivation of nearly all value, 90% for instance, may be analyzed as a
deprivation of all economic value and thus effect a per se taking.'35 Moreover,
landowners have had some success alleging a per se taking-or at least a
substantial economic impact, potentially outweighing the state interest-based
on either of two alternative theories: that they have been denied the highest
and best economic use'36 or that the regulation has extinguished a fundamental
attribute of their property ownership.' Although the Supreme Court has
131. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1979).
132. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
133. See infra Subsection II.A.3.
134. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 ("Although no precise rule determines when property has been
taken, the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests.").
135. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
136. The deprivation-of-best-use idea was discussed in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946), where the government was found to have taken an overflight easement resulting in destruction of
the plaintiff's commercial chicken farm, even though the land could still presumably be used for
agriculture, for example. See id. at 262-63.
The highest and best use claim, however, has been directly rejected by several lower courts. See,
e.g., Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (1981) ("In effect, the 'highest and best use'
argument is just another way of saying that there has been some diminution in value, rather than the
complete destruction of all economically viable uses of the property. The Court, however, clearly rejects
the notion that diminution in value, by itself, can establish a taking."); see also William C. Haas & Co.
v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1979). The claim was also criticized
by Justice Blackmun while dissenting in Lucas. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the trial court's determination of a taking through deprivation of all economic value was
"an erroneous assumption" because camping and recreational uses were still available). The economic
inquiry "focus[es] on the uses the regulations permit," not on the extent to which a use is prohibited.
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978). The fact that "the most
profitable use [is denied] is not dispositive." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). Thus, the
proposition that deprivation of best use results in a regulatory taking is, though not altogether
unsupported, of dubious effect.
137. Like the highest and best use argument, the notion that deprivation of a fundamental
attribute of property may, in itself, effect a taking, is supported-but only thinly-by the Court's Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence. It is undisputed that deprivation of certain property rights results in a
taking-for example, the right to exclude others, see, e.g., Kaiser Aetna Inc. v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 179-80 (1979), or the right to pass on property to one's heirs, see Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,
715 (1987).
However, it is doubtful that deprivation of the profit right, without more, would require
compensation. In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), the Court rejected plaintiff's claim that the
Eagle Protection Act's prohibition on selling avian artifacts effected a taking. "[D]enial of one
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alluded to these doctrines in recent years,'38 it is doubtful that these doctrines
would provide the basis for a successful takings claim today.'39
Having briefly considered the primary modes of economic impact
analysis, it is time to return to the problems of our hypothetical owners. Since
the takings inquiry turns, above all, on the specific facts of the case, it should
come as little surprise that application of the foregoing principles to our four
property owners produces four separate results. As to Acme Lumber the
analysis is simple. Since only one fifth of its property is affected (100 of 500
acres), the economic impact factor weighs strongly against a taking. The case
of Larry Logger is, on the other hand, more complex since half of his property
was affected (25 of 50 acres). Nonetheless, the very fact that only half of the
property was impacted militates against finding a taking.' 40 Moreover, a
compensable taking is unlikely to be found, since the government can argue
that--even as to the 25 acres affected-not all of the economic value was
taken. As Justice Brennan noted in Penn Central, the economic inquiry
focuses on the uses the regulation permits. 14 ' Larry's tree farm, for example,
might be turned into residential property-a potentially valuable use, even if
not the highest or best use, since his land is adjacent to Holly Homeowner's
and proximate to the creek. In summary, then, ESA regulations have caused
Acme (for certain) and Larry (in all probability) to suffer merely
noncompensable diminutions in value.
Holly's and Lonnie's cases differ from Acme's and Larry's in several
respects, not the least of which is the fact that their entire respective parcels
are affected. This fact alone makes a court more likely to find a compensable
taking, because the "parcel as a whole" rule-which effectively frustrates
takings claims where substantially less than the entire parcel is affected-
would not apply against them. However, while Holly's and Lonnie's claims
are similar in that their entire properties are affected, their claims are
traditional property right does not always amount to a taking," the Court reasoned. Id. at 65. "At least
where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle
is not a taking .... " Id. at 65-66. The Andrus Court concludes that "loss of future profits-
unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-provides a slender reed on which to rest a takings
claim." Id. at 66. The Andrus decision may in fact be on shaky ground in the wake of the Court's
holding in Hodel. While the Hodel Court did not expressly overrule or reaffirm Andrus, a Scalia-led
concurrence contended that the Court's decision "effectively limits [Andrus] to its facts." See Hodel, 481
U.S. at 719 (Scalia, J., concurring). But see id. at 718 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("nothing in today's
opinion ... would limit Andrus").
138. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262 ("Although the ordinances limit development, they neither
prevent the best use of appellants' land ... nor extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership [and
thus do not effect a taking].")
139. See supra notes 136-137.
140. For examples of cases in which courts rejected takings claims where no more than half of
the owner's property was affected, see supra note 130.
141. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
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distinguishable in at least one important respect. While Holly's use or value of
the property as a home is merely diminished by obstruction of her creek view,
all of Lonnie's value is taken since she may no longer use any of her property
for timber production.
Whereas Holly most likely fails to state a prima facie takings claim,
Lonnie succeeds. Although the government will surely argue that Lonnie has
not been deprived of all possible use-she could still use her property for
camping or recreation, or even for residential purposes-this defense would
likely fail on the facts and the law. Since the hypothetical fact pattern
presumes that Lonnie's property is "rugged and remote," residential
development is not a reasonable or viable economic use. 142 While it may be
asserted that Lonnie could still use her land for any number of activities-for
example, picnicking, swimming, or camping-and that, after all, she retains
the right to exclude, 143 such allegations do not necessarily defeat her takings
claim: first, because these are not necessarily "reasonable economic" uses;
second, because even if some small economic use remains, the original
economic value has been seriously affected. Thus, although a per se regulatory
taking may be unavailable, a weighing of the public and private interests
involved'" would result in a taking under the three-factor balancing test.
In summary, application of the Court's economic impact analysis
demonstrates that whether ESA regulations effect a taking depends
significantly on the particular facts. In many cases, such as those of Acme,
Larry, and Holly, a taking is unlikely to be found because either much less
than the entire parcel is affected (Acme and Larry) or because much less than
all economic value is taken out of the affected portion (Larry and Holly). In
cases like Acme's, Larry's, or Holly's, courts will usually find that the state
interest behind the ESA outweighs the mere diminution in value to the
property owners, and thus that no taking has been effected. However, there are
many imaginable cases like Lonnie's where most or all of the owner's
property is affected and where all or nearly all economic use is deprived. In
such cases, a compensable taking is likely to be found, whether pursuant to
Lucas's per se regulatory takings analysis (if all or nearly all-perhaps 90%-
142. Note that the question is whether "reasonable" or "viable" economic uses remain. See, e.g.,
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009 ("prohibition deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use"); Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("denial of the permit for the 98 acres
was a taking because it left plaintiff with no reasonable economic uses"). Given the remoteness of
Lonnie's property, residential housing is probably not a reasonable use.
143. These arguments were made by Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Lucas, by way of criticism
of the trial court's decision that Lucas had in fact been deprived of all economic value. See Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1044.
144. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1979) ("[T]he question necessarily
requires a weighing of private and public interests.").
Yale Journal on Regulation
value is taken'45) or as a result of Penn Central's three-factor balancing
inquiry (if substantial, but less than all, value is taken).
3. Reasonable Expectations and the Police Power Exception to Takings
Having seen that the governmental action factor weighs against a taking
and that the economic impact factor may argue for or against compensation,
depending on the circumstances, only the last Penn Central factor-the degree
of interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations-remains to
be considered. While the governmental action and economic impact factors
are readily understandable, it is less clear what "reasonable, investment-
backed expectations" means. Obviously, the factor relates to the private
interest concerned. However, it is unclear how the expectations analysis
differs from the economic impact inquiry. Indeed, the ambiguity surrounding
the third Penn Central prong, and its potential for overlap with the economic
impact factor, have often led courts either to ignore it altogether' 46 or to treat it
in conjunction with the economic impact analysis. 147
Given the vagueness of the expectations factor, I suggest an alternative
way of understanding it that comports with the Court's recent takings
jurisprudence. Although the Lucas Court never explicitly discussed Penn
Central's expectations factor (since a per se regulatory taking was found), the
Court did provide its own idea of what a landowner's reasonable expectations
include. This idea involves the right to continue, or receive compensation for,
those economic uses not prohibited under common law principles of nuisance
and property. While strictly speaking the Lucas holding (as to the background
principles of nuisance and property law) defines the bounds of the police
power exception to takings, Lucas also informs the inquiry into what sort of
owner's expectations are reasonable and compensable under the Fifth
Amendment. Since, in the wake of Lucas, "background principles of the
State's law of property and nuisance"'' 48 at the same time define the police
power exception and supply substance to an owner's reasonable expectations,
the two issues are analyzed jointly throughout the remainder of the section.
145. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
146. The Agins Court, in effect, drops the third Penn Central factor. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260
("The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.")
(citation omitted).
147. Indeed, even the Penn Central Court, which is responsible for the three-factor test, never
explicitly applied the reasonable expectations prong or distinguished it from the economic impact
analysis. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 ("[T]he New York City law does not interfere in any way
with the present uses of the Terminal.") (emphasis added). It is unclear how the "interference with
present uses" is distinct from the regulation's economic impact.
148. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
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Whereas other takings challenges before the Supreme Court have
involved such traditional regulations as zoning laws'49 or coal mining 5°
restrictions, Lucas is a particularly important case for the ESA because the
governmental purpose behind the challenged statute' 5' was ecological, a non-
traditional state interest. For Professor Joseph Sax, the Lucas decision is
"invest[ed] . . . with fundamental importance,"'1 2 since the Court "correctly
perceives that an ecological worldview presents a fundamental challenge to
established property rights, but the Court incorrectly rejects that challenge."' 53
In Lucas, Professor Sax sees a conflict between what he labels the
"transformative economy"-the conventional perspective of private
property-and the "economy of nature"-an ecological view of property."'
Whereas the traditional conception of property views ownership as
transformation of land out of its natural state into productive use, the
ecological perspective sees such transformation as diminishing the functioning
of the natural economy.'55 Accordingly, the goal of ecologically-motivated
legislation is to preserve land in its natural state. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court affirmed this goal in the landmark environmental case, Just v. Marinette
County,'56 concluding that "it is not an unreasonable exercise of [police]
power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use of private property
to its natural uses."'
' 57
Lucas, by limiting the police power exception to those harms preventable
under common law nuisance or property, rejects the ecological perspective of
Just and affirms the traditional, transformative view of property that
landowners have vested rights in those uses not prohibited under traditional
property law. In other words, the state may regulate in the interest of ecology,
but must pay compensation if such regulation prevents otherwise valid
economic uses. As the Court presumes that "the erection of any habitable or
productive improvements" would not have been prevented at common law, ' 8
it is clear that Lucas embraces the transformative rather than the ecological
view of property. In turn, the transformative view of property gives rise to a
set of reasonable expectations for the landowner, including the fundamental
149. See, e.g., Agins, 447 U.S. at 257; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107.
150. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922).
151. The purpose of South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act was to preserve the
beach/dune system in order to prevent erosion. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1040-41.
152. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1440 (1993).
153. Id. at 1439.
154. See id. at 1442.
155. See id.
156. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
157. Id. at 768.
158. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
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expectation that traditionally permissible property uses may not be abrogated
without compensation.
One can respond to Lucas in one of two ways: by arguing that ecological
regulation is nonetheless within the police power, as part of the public trust
doctrine, and is unaffected by Lucas, or by conceding that Lucas excludes
ecological regulation from the police power exception to takings, and then
explaining why the case should have been decided differently.
One of the earliest applications of the public trust doctrine to wildlife
resources occurred in Geer v. Connecticut.59 In Geer, the Court, prior'to
upholding a state hunting regulation, traced the history of wildlife back to
Roman law and declared that "it is the duty of the legislature to enact such
laws as will best preserve [game] and secure its beneficial use in the future to
the people of the State."' 60 While Geer is helpful authority for the proposition
that regulation of wildlife is within the police power, it is neither a strong
authority,' 6 ' nor is it representative of the public trust doctrine. Traditionally,
the public trust doctrine is of narrow scope. Simply put, the doctrine asserts
that "states own the submerged soil and foreshore of all navigable bodies of
water.' 62 Indeed, even advocates of an expansive public trust doctrine
acknowledge that it is "normally limited to land that is under water or at least
is wetland."'6 3
But would an expansive understanding of the public trust doctrine
comport with the Court's opinion in Lucas?164 For at least one commentator,
the answer is yes: "The trust acts similarly to the nuisance doctrine in
restricting uses of property inconsistent with the public's interest. Therefore,
the public trust doctrine embodies the type of limitation the Lucas Court
exempted from takings claims.' 65 This analysis, however, does not heed
Lucas's dictate to look to the "background principles" of property law and
thus fails to appreciate the historically limited scope of the public trust
159. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
160. Id. at 534.
161. The Geer idea of state ownership of wildlife was overruled by the Court in Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
162. Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical
Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
511, 589 (1975); see Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 461-62 (1892) (upholding the
legislative revocation of state's transfer of submerged land to railway because navigable waters are in
public trust for the people).
163. Ralph W. Johnson & William C. Galloway, Can the Public Trust Doctrine Prevent
Extinctions?, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW 157, 163 (William Snape III ed., 1996).
164. The same question has been posed and answered in the negative by James S. Burling. James
S. Burling, Of Nuisances and Public Trusts-Can Lucas be Evaded? C997 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 259, 280-82
(1995). Mr. Burling argues that an expansion of the traditional conception of nuisance is not justified by
the public trust doctrine or otherwise. See id. at 280-82.
165. Lynda Graham Cook, Comment, Lucas and Endangered Species Protection: When "Take"
and "Takings" Collide, 27 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 185, 209 (1993).
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doctrine. The doctrine restricts private use of certain property (navigable
waters), but not of natural resources in general. Professor Sax, who has written
extensively on the public trust doctrine, 6 6 concludes that Lucas endorses the
transformative, private-minded view of property, antithetical to an expansive
vision of the public trust doctrine.'67
While some ESA advocates contend that Lucas is not inconsistent with a
public trust limitation on private use of property, Professor Sax concedes that
the decision precludes such a limitation on the use of property. This is not to
say that Professor Sax and like-minded ESA advocates believe that Lucas was
decided correctly. On the contrary, Professor Sax simply acknowledges the
importance of the decision and then goes on to explain why it should have
been decided differently. For Professor Sax, Lucas is wrong to adopt a takings
standard based on historically bound nuisance and property law because such
a standard fails to take into account the newly important and accepted
"economy of nature."' 161
What effect does Lucas have on takings law generally? And more
specifically, what effect does it have on takings claims against ESA
regulation? Read narrowly, Lucas has a significant but not revolutionary effect
on takings law. Restricted to its holding, Lucas only limits the availability of
the police power exception to takings. It does not aid a landowner in making
out a prima facie takings challenge; it merely narrows the government's
defense to such a claim. Our hypothetical landowners, for example, would not
be aided under this limited interpretation of Lucas. Acme, Larry, and Holly
still most likely would not succeed in their takings claims since the public
interest in ESA regulation outweighs their privately-suffered mere
diminutions in value. This reading of Lucas, however, does assure that
Lonnie's takings claim-otherwise successful in that it satisfies the ad hoc
Penn Central test (or Lucas "all economic value" test)' 6 9-would not be
denied on the grounds that ESA regulations are justified pursuant to the
takings-exempt police power.
166. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 U. MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
167. See Sax, supra note 152, at 1433.
168. At the most basic level, the differing responses of the environmental community to Lucas
stem from differing readings of legal history. Commentators such as Ms. Cook (who believe Lucas does
not limit application of the public trust doctrine) work from the premise that traditional property law
included public trust limitations on private use. See Cook, supra note 165, at 206-7. Professor Sax, on
the other hand, starts from the position that traditional, "transformative" property law permitted private
uses as long as they did not cause harm. Sax does not list extinction of species within this traditional
concept of harm (though it may have included adverse effects on game animals). See Sax, supra note
152, at 1443-45.
169. See supra Subsection II.A.2.
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However, a much broader reading of Lucas is possible. Professor Sax
perceives that, "[t]hough the Lucas majority does not say so explicitly, its
adoption of a standard based upon historically bounded nuisance and property
law reflects a sentiment that a state should compensate landowners who,
through no fault of their own, lose property rights because of scientific or
social transformations."' 7 While Professor Sax clearly does not approve this
sentiment, he does recognize its practical implications for takings law. If an
owner is to be compensated for the economic impact occasioned by any new,
non-nuisance type of property restriction, then environmental regulation-
species protection in particular-could hardly go on. If Lucas's underlying
message (that owners have a reasonable expectation in continuing property
uses permissible at common law) does more than simply limit the bounds of
the police power exception-that is, if the Lucas-created expectations are
imported into Penn Central's "reasonable expectations" prong of inquiry-
then takings claims pursuant to the three-factor balancing test could be much
more likely to succeed.
Lucas announces that the state "may resist compensation only if the
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that
the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.' 7 ' In the
context of the ESA, does this mean that a takings plaintiff who acquired the
subject land prior to the ESA's enactment would have a strong argument that
an ESA regulation interfered with his "reasonable expectations?"'72 What
about a takings plaintiff who acquired land after the ESA's enactment but
prior to the challenged listing or designation?73 Would she also be able to
claim that the ESA had interfered with her reasonable expectations? If so, then
Penn Central's expectations factor would, in the context of a challenged ESA
regulation, almost always weigh in favor of compensation and would often tip
the balance of private and public interests in favor of a taking.
170. Sax, supra note 152, at 1449. But see Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten Laws that
Protect Private Property, People, Public Lands, and Natural Resources, SBI4 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 221, 233
(1996) ("Justice Scalia's majority opinion recognized that courts, in deciding what land uses satisfy
property and nuisance law, should account for newly perceived environmental dangers: 'Changed
circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so."') (footnote
omitted).
171. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
172. At least one commentator reads Lucas to mean just that (though her observation is not
specific to the ESA): "A property owner challenging restrictions that the government imposed after the
owner acquired the property has a better chance of bringing a successful taking claim." Virginia S.
Albrecht, Regulatory Takings Issues in the Context of Federal Wetlands, Endangered Species, and
Surface Mining Regulation, C997 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 307, 325 (1995) (citing Lucas's observation that the
plaintiff was not subject to beachfront development restrictions at the time he acquired the property).
173. See id.
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III. Why No Takings Claims Under the ESA?
In light of the breadth of the ESA and the liberalization of regulatory
takings doctrine, it would seem logical that promulgation of regulations under
the ESA would invite Fifth Amendment takings challenges. Indeed, as
demonstrated in the previous part, at least several scenarios of possible takings
effected by the ESA are imaginable. Why, then, is there no record of
regulatory takings claims under the ESA having been litigated in federal
courts?'7 4 And does it follow that there will continue to be few such
challenges to the ESA?
A. Some Explanations for the Lack of Takings Challenges to ESA
Regulations
Immediately following is a brief consideration of various possible
explanations for the dearth of regulatory takings claims under the ESA. The
second half of this part will analyze, in greater detail, what I contend to be the
primary reason why ESA regulations have not been challenged in court by
property owners: the habitat conservation planning process.
1. Few Regulations During Early History of ESA
One explanation for the lack of takings claims during the ESA's first
quarter-century is that, at least during the early years of the Act, relatively few
species were listed under the Act. Even today, critical habitat has been
designated for less than 15 percent of species.'75 While as a legal matter the
lack of critical habitat does not excuse a landowner from section 9 take
prohibitions, as a practical matter critical habitat designation focuses
landowners, environmentalists, and the FWS on the habitat in question and
thus makes enforcement of the section 9 prohibition-and perhaps takings
challenges-more likely to occur. The ESA is unique among regulatory
statutes in that the breadth and weight of its regulatory impact are constantly
changing, or more precisely, are constantly expanding as species are identified
as endangered much faster than listed species are recovering. As more species
are identified as endangered and as more habitat is designated, private
property will be increasingly affected, and there is at least the potential for a
surge in regulatory takings challenges.
174. There is at least one noteworthy suit alleging a regulatory taking by the ESA and Bald
Eagle Protection Act regulations that was litigated in a Florida state court. See Florida Game and Fresh
Water Fish Comm'n v. Flotilla, 636 So. 2d 761, 765-66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting taking
claim because only 48 of landowner's 173 acres were affected).
175. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings &
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REv. 305, 315 (1997).
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2. Uncertainty as to Whether Habitat Modification Was Harm Under
ESA
Until the Court's decision three years ago in Sweet Home, it was unclear
whether the FWS's broad definition of harm was within the scope of the ESA
as a whole. As long as habitat modification might be understood as
permissible, the section 9 take prohibition could be seen as applying only to
the direct and physical harming of a species. Under such a restrictive
interpretation of section 9, a very small amount of any person's land would be
affected. While prior to Sweet Home a person was clearly forbidden to
"pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect"'76 a listed species, it
was not certain whether destruction of habitat constituted impermissible harm.
Accordingly, the FWS utilized a species-by-species approach in administering
the ESA, disregarding the broader needs of the habitat or ecosystem upon
which each species depended. Under the Clinton Administration, however, the
FWS has begun to shift priorities from protection of individual species to
preservation of ecosystems,'77 as demonstrated by the increasing use of large-
scale critical habitat designations and regional habitat conservation
planning.' This shift in approach, validated by the Court's Sweet Home
decision, promises to affect land uses to a much greater degree than before and
suggests that regulatory takings challenges would be more likely.
3. FWS Efforts to Avoid Impacts on Private Property
There is ample evidence to support the hypothesis that the FWS has,
whenever possible, sought to avoid direct regulatory impacts on private
property. Indeed, the ESA itself includes provisions designed to minimize the
effect of endangered species regulation on property owners. Critical habitat,
for example, is to be designated only "to the maximum extent prudent and
determinable"'7 9 and only "after taking into consideration the economic
impact, and any other relevant impact"'8 0 of such designation. Additionally,
the ESA provides for a habitat conservation planning process to mitigate the
impact of ESA regulations on private land uses.'8' The FWS, in its
discretionary administration of the ESA, has in many instances gone out of its
176. Endangered Species Act § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
177. See Henne, supra note 22, at 6-10.
178. See J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws
Regulating Non Federal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 555,
591 (1995).
179. Endangered Species Act § 4(a)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (1994).
180. Endangered Species Act § 4(b)(2).
181. See Endangered Species Act § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)-(d) (1994); see also infra Section
III.B.
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way to shield landowners from regulation, thus triggering lawsuits from
environmental organizations to require the listing of species and the
designation of critical habitat. 82 Moreover, even when the FWS has
designated critical habitat, it has done so with the utmost care to avoid
including private lands in the designation. In the case of the northern spotted
owl, for example, the FWS initially proposed to designate 11,639,195 acres of
federal, state and private lands as critical habitat. 83 After vehement protests
from private interests, the FWS's final designation reduced the critical habitat
to 6,887,000 acres, all of which was federal land.1 84 Recently, however, the
FWS has shown greater willingness to designate some private land as critical
habitat. 85 Such actions may touch off-and in at least one case, have touched
offP8 -regulatory takings suits.
4. Property-Friendly Regulatory Takings Law Only a Recent
Phenomenon
In addition to the ESA- or FWS-related factors that have often kept
private property from being regulated pursuant to the Act, there are several
reasons landowners have not brought takings suits even when their property
has been substantially affected. First, regulatory takings law, until only
recently, appeared stacked entirely in the government's favor. As one
commentator points out
182. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Dep't of Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding in part that allegations of increased threat to species from designation of critical
habitat did not justify the decision not to designate habitat upon listing of gnatcatcher as threatened
species); see also Ruhl, supra note 178, at 595.
183. See Proposed Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 56 Fed. Reg.
20,816 (1991) (proposed May 6, 1991).
184. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.95(b) (1997).
185. In May of 1996, in response to a lawsuit filed by the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the
FWS issued a final rule designating 3,900,000 acres as critical habitat for the threatened marbled
murrelet. The FWS included 48,000 acres of privately held land in the designation, including the 30,000-
acre Headwaters Forest owned by Pacific Lumber in Northern California. See Government Marks 3.9
Million Acres for Marbled Murrelet, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 1996, at A4.
186. Upon designation of critical habitat for the murrelet, Pacific Lumber, the owner of the
Headwaters Forest, filed a regulatory takings claim in the Court of Federal Claims. See Todd Woody,
Pacific Lumber Tries New Tack in Timber Wars, RECORDER, May 10, 1996, at 1. Pacific Lumber has,
for the present time, withdrawn the lawsuit, pending a settlement with the federal government. The so-
called Headwaters Deal involves Pacific Lumber's (1) trading its land in the Headwaters for state and
federal land elsewhere, and (2) dropping its takings suit against the federal government. The deal,
however, is contingent upon approval of a habitat conservation plan on Pacific Lumber's remaining
acres adjacent to the Headwaters Forest. Although the FWS has recently announced its "tentative
agreement" to a habitat conservation plan, the details of the agreement must still be worked out by May
1998, at which time the plan will be subject to an additional two months of public review. See Carolyn
Lochhead, New Deal to Save Trees at Headwaters, S.F. CHRON., February 28, 1998, at AI.
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Constitutional takings protections were at their nadir when Congress
passed the ESA in 1973. The Supreme Court had not found any
regulatory action to be a taking for years, and most commentators
viewed [Penn Central] as an outright admission that the Court would
not use the takings protections to restrict governmental regulation. 1
87
It was not until Lucas in 1992 that the Court announced a per se
regulatory takings analysis, questioned the "parcel as a whole" rule, and
limited the police power takings exception to background principles of
nuisance law.'88 As argued here, there are takings claims imaginable under the
ESA that would be meritorious under the Court's current takings
jurisprudence; perhaps these arguments will be employed by property owners
affected by ESA regulations in the coming years.
5. Costliness of Takings Suits and Inducements to Settle
Finally, a pedestrian, but not trivial, explanation for why a property owner
might not prosecute a potentially meritorious takings claim has to do with the
time and expense involved. As in any other litigation context, it may be
rational, from an economic standpoint, to settle a claim rather than incur the
legal expenses and time expenditures of litigating a case to judgment. The
costs of litigating takings claims are especially high because of the fact-
sensitive nature of the inquiry (which means summary judgment is seldom
appropriate) and the dearth of case law on regulatory takings under the ESA
(which leaves even a favorable judgment subject to an uncertain appeal).
Indeed, several recently instituted regulatory takings suits under the ESA now
appear likely to settle. 189
6. Summary
This section has focused on the various reasons why-assuming
meritorious regulatory takings claims may arise, from time to time-there
have been no regulatory takings decisions under the ESA in federal courts.
However, with the exception of the last one (costliness of takings litigation),
187. Thompson, supra note 175, at 324.
188. See supra Subsection II.A.3.
189. See discussion of Headwaters deal, supra note 186. In another case, Ben Cone, a property
owner whose plans to harvest timber have been thwarted by the presence of endangered red cockaded
woodpeckers, filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims. He withdrew his suit, however, once the FWS
approved the incidental take permit he sought, permitting him to "kill" (incidentally) 29 woodpeckers.
See Marianne Lavelle, Feds Settle to Save Act and Species, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1996, at Al. Given the
experiences of Cone and Pacific Lumber, it appears that the potential of a successful takings claim
against the ESA may serve as an ace-in-the-hole in negotiations, thus inducing the government to settle
by approving the sought-after habitat conservation plan on the landowner's terms.
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these factors are not as likely to present serious barriers to takings claims in
the future. The number of species listed and the amount of habitat designated
increases each year, including the amount of private property designated as
critical habitat; habitat modification has been found to constitute a prohibited
section 9 harm; the FWS has shifted away from species-by-species
management to an ecosystem approach to wildlife conservation; and, perhaps
most significantly, courts are becoming more willing to find merit in
regulatory takings claims. Assuming these trends continue, there will be a
greater likelihood of Fifth Amendment takings challenges to the ESA in the
coming years than ever before. 9 °
Despite the fact, however, that the old reasons for the dearth of takings
claims are of fading importance, there is at least one obstacle of more recent
vintage that will pose perhaps the most serious barrier to future regulatory
takings challenges of the ESA: the section 10 habitat conservation planning
process.
B. Habitat Conservation Planning as a Barrier to Takings Claims
Added to the ESA in a 1982 amendment, the section 10 habitat
conservation planning process was little used during its first decade of
existence. 19 Only since the beginning of the Clinton Administration has
190. The prediction that there is likely to be a surge in regulatory takings claims under the ESA
is not entirely novel. At least one recent article has foreshadowed such an outcome. Professor Thompson
considers the relationship between vigorous enforcement of wetlands violations in the early 1980s and
successful takings challenges to wetlands regulations in the early 1990s. As he observes, "the
government's active use of [ESA] section 9 is relatively recent-dating back only to the late 1980s ....
If the [wetlands] section 404 trend is a sound predictor, ESA cases should now start emerging."
Thompson, supra note 175, at 327. Perhaps Cone's and Pacific Lumber's takings challenges represent
the leading edge of the coming groundswell of such claims.
191. For a thorough analysis of how habitat conservation planning works in practice, see Lin,
supra note 23. It is perhaps helpful at this time to describe an actual HCP and the process involved in
obtaining it. The pros and cons of the HCP program are nicely illustrated in the case of Murray Pacific
Corp. A timber company, Murray Pacific, owns a 55,000 acre tree-farm in the state of Washington. In
1990, the spotted owl was listed as an endangered species. At that time, regulations were promulgated
mandating "owl protection circles" in which logging could not occur. For Murray (which had three owls
on its property), the trees inside the circles amounted to 40% of the marketable timber on its land. After
three years and $500,000, Murray won the FWS's approval of its HCP by which, for a period of 100
years, Murray could clear-cut spotted owl habitat in exchange for its promise to provide certain benefits
for the bird (e.g., providing a migratory corridor between owl populations, hastening the growth of
forests through fertilizer, tree thinning, etc.). See Sandi Doughton, Owl Deal Gives Space to Logging
and Habitat, MORNING NEWS TRIB., Oct. 8, 1993, at Al. Only a few months after Murray agreed to the
owl HCP, a marbled murrelet (another listed species) was discovered on the property. Again, activity
was stopped. In June 1995 (a year and a half after discovery of the murrelet), Murray and the FWS
agreed to an HCP covering all species (28 others besides the murrelet and owl) for a duration of 100
years. Timber harvesting could be resumed, but at a high cost: Murray spent $1.75 million in developing
the HCP (not counting forgone timber revenues). The company estimates that the agreed-upon
protection measures (such as abiding by harvest limits and selective cutting practices) will cost more
than $100,000,000 over the next 50 years. See Kim Murphy, Timber Owners Cut a Deal to Preserve
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section 10 been of much practical significance. Whereas fewer than twenty
habitat conservation plans (HCPs) were approved in the Reagan and Bush
administrations, more than 200 HCPs have been negotiated since 1993.92 The
idea behind HCPs is a simple one: Private landowners may be permitted to
pursue some economic activity on their land, even though such activity may
incidentally take a listed species (e.g., through adverse habitat modification).
The HCP-pursuant to which an incidental take permit (ITP) is granted-
must demonstrate that the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable,
minimize and mitigate the impacts of its incidental taking and that the taking
will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival of the species in the
wild. 9 3 In sum, the section 10 HCP process is a concession to landowners-an
acknowledgement that ESA regulations perhaps "go too far" from time to
time, and that some land uses should be allowed, as long as their purpose is
not to harm and as long as they do not seriously impact the overall survival of
the species.
However, although the availability of HCPs appears to be designed for the
benefit of property owners, section 10 may, in some instances, harm
landowners more than it helps them, to the extent that section 10 frustrates
takings claims against the ESA. 194
1. Availability of HCP Process as Ripeness Obstacle to Takings Suit
While to this point, the discussion of regulatory takings doctrine has been
limited to the substantive law, there is a procedural hurdle to regulatory
takings challenges that may prove to be the most serious obstacle to takings
suits: the ripeness requirement. In the Court's leading ripeness opinion in the
context of regulatory takings, Williamson County Regional Planning
Wildlife Habitat Environment, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1995, at 1. After two tries, Murray has a measure of
certainty, but at a substantial cost.
192. See Lavelle, supra note 189.
193. For a more detailed and referenced discussion of the section 10 process, see supra
Subsection I.A.6.
194. According to Congressman Lamar Smith:
Some claim that [HCPs] like the [Balcones Canyonland Conservation Plan (BCCP)] fix these
problems with the Endangered Species Act-that they provide fairness and flexibility to
landowners like Ms. Rector and improve conservation of species like the golden cheeked
warbler. But close examination shows that BCCP does not correct these problems. And that
they create a whole new class of endangered landowners.
Hearings on Endangered Species Act Habitat Conservation Plans Before the House Comm. on
Resources, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Congressman Lamar Smith), available in 1996 WL
10829993.
Congressman Smith went on to characterize mitigation fees for use of private property as
"extortion." Id. For Congressman Smith, apparently no reduction in value is justified. Implicitly, this is
the position of landowners who would rather bring a regulatory takings suit for full compensation than
settle for an HCP that would likely require some diminution in value.
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Commission v. Hamilton Bank,'95 the majority held that a property owner
must, prior to bringing suit in federal court, (1) submit a plan for development
of the property to the regulatory agency, and (2) obtain a final decision from
the regulatory agency as to the type and intensity of development the agency
will allow.'96 Moreover, to satisfy the finality requirement, the landowner
must first exhaust all administrative remedies by applying for variances or
waivers if the development plan is initially denied.'97
The ripeness requirement for regulatory takings is particularly significant
in the ESA context because of the availability of ITPs-in effect, variances
from the mandates of ESA regulations-through the section 10 HCP program.
Although for the time being, there is a dearth of authority addressing ripeness
in the context of takings suits under the ESA,' 98 a federal court would likely
require a plaintiff to have applied for and been denied an HCP. For that
matter, a landowner would perhaps be required to have submitted several HCP
applications to meet Hamilton Bank's strict finality requirement. If recent
experience with the section 10 HCP process is any indication, virtually no
property owners would meet the tough ripeness standard if that standard is
strictly interpreted. This is because HCP applications are approved, almost
without exception.'99 If, therefore, the Hamilton Bank ripeness standard is
strictly applied to ESA takings suits, then the government can prevent such
195. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
196. See id. at 186.
197. See id. at 190. Indeed, the Court has suggested that Hamilton Bank's finality requirement
may require multiple proposals or variance applications before a landowner's case may be considered
ripe. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 353 n.9 (1986) ("[r]ejection of
exceedingly grandiose development plans does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive
similarly unfavorable reviews"). Only last year, the Court was urged to establish a rule that a takings
plaintiff need only make a single proposal and a single request for a variance to ensure the ripeness of
his claim. The Court avoided the issue on the grounds it was not presented in the case. See Suitum v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1667 n.12 (1997) (holding that a landowner's
takings claim was ripe for review since agency had finally determined that the plaintiff's land was in
area where development was prohibited; the landowner's failure to apply for potential TDRs did not
preclude the finding of ripeness).
198. See Four Points Utility Joint Venture v. United States, 40 Env't Rep. Cont. (AWA) 1509,
1511 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (takings claim, based on ESA regulations, was not ripe because plaintiffs failed
to apply for an ESA section 10 incidental take permit); Killington, Ltd. v. Vermont, 668 A.2d 1278,
1283 (Vt, 1995) (takings claim unripe where permit denial contained mitigation measures that would
satisfy state law endangered species concerns and allow for development).
199. According to a special quantitative report on the record of the ESA in its first two decades,
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) found that only one HCP application had been
denied in the Act's history (more precisely, in the 10-year history of the section 10 HCP provision). See
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES AND NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING
ACTIONS 19 (1992). A similarly lopsided proportion of HCPs have been approved in the last few years.
See Thompson, supra note 175, at 377 (during 25-month period, June 1, 1994-June 30, 1996, "[olver
90% of the application notices were followed later in the Federal Register by notices of permit issuance.
Many of the other applications may also have been approved, although there was no formal notice in the
Federal Register.").
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suits virtually at will by simply approving those permit applications
landowners must submit, or by denying them while suggesting mitigation
measures that would allow a permit to be approved on reapplication.2 0 Indeed,
this appears to be precisely how the FWS has administered section 10, and
there is no indication that a change of course is imminent.2"'
It should be noted that the Hamilton Bank ripeness requirement has been
qualified to some extent by holdings of the Court of Federal Claims. This is
important because, pursuant to the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims
has exclusive jurisdiction over takings suits against the federal government for
sums in excess of $10,000.202 The Court of Federal Claims has shown
sympathy to regulatory takings plaintiffs caught in the permit approval
process, having dismissed such a claim for lack of ripeness only once in the
last decade. 203 Recognizing that the ripeness requirement could provide the
government with a means of perpetually avoiding a regulatory takings
challenge (by repeatedly denying permit applications but leaving open the
possibility that an alternative version may be approved, thus never rendering a
final decision), this court has fashioned two exceptions to the obligation of
continuing pursuit of administrative remedies: first, where such pursuit would
be futile, it being clear that no permit would be approved,20 4 and, second,
where such pursuit would be so burdensome that the process of obtaining
relief would "effectively deprive ... the property of value."20 5 Rather than
requiring, as in Hamilton Bank, that the government reach a "final
decision,"2 6 the claims court merely requires that the gOvernment "reach a
decision that actually affects the plaintiff.
207
200. In fact, such a strategy on the part of the FWS-rubber-stamping landowners' HCP
applications to avoid takings lawsuits-has been identified (and vociferously opposed) by many
environmentalists. See, e.g., Washington Habitat Conservation Plan Draws Criticism, AMERICAN
POLITICAL NETWORK-GREENWIRE, Nov. 19, 1996. As landowners seek more concessions and as
environmentalists exert more pressure on the FWS to deny such concessions, the FWS will perhaps be
less inclined to routinely approve HCP applications.
201. Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt has consistently been a strong proponent of habitat
conservation planning, extolling its benefits to both landowners and species. See Babbitt, supra note 1.
202. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (1994).
203. See Minority Media of Pahrump, Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 379, 382-83 (1992)
(finding a failure to exhaust all administrative remedies); see also Thompson, supra note 175, at 326. It
should, however, be noted that a recent decision of the Court of Federal Claims suggests that the court
would require at least one reapplication after permit denial for a takings challenge to be ripe. See Good
v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 102-03 (1997) ("By requiring developers to make a good faith effort to
satisfy permitting agency concerns after an initial denial, ripeness doctrine reflects the reality that land
development often involves a process of negotiation between the permitting agency and developer.").
204. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 387, 405 (1995); Anaheim Gardens v. United
States, 33 Fed. Cl. 24, 31 (1995).
205. Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 164 (1996).
206, Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985).
207. Steams Co. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 264, 269 (1995); see also Thompson, supra note
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While the futility exception is likely to be unavailing for most ESA
regulatory takings plaintiffs since HCPs are almost always approved,2"8
plaintiffs may successfully argue that continued pursuit of an HCP approval
would be so burdensome that the process of obtaining relief would
"effectively deprive the property of value." The process of preparing an HCP
and waiting for approval can be quite costly.
As a practical matter, given the FWS's lack of resources, the landowner
pays the high price of hiring field scientists and environmental consultants to
help develop the HCP.2°9 Moreover, while the HCP is in development and
pending approval, still larger sums of money may be forfeited in lost
opportunity costs. The more time the FWS takes to review a submitted HCP,
the greater the economic burden on the applicant. Given the lengthy delays
that are characteristic of FWS review,21° there is the potential in many
instances that waiting for a final decision regarding an HCP may be so
burdensome as to deprive the property of value, thus qualifying a takings suit
as "ripe" under the Court of Federal Claims's case law.
2. Granting of HCP as Precluding Per Se Regulatory Taking
The availability of HCPs not only imposes a procedural obstacle to
takings suits under the ESA, it presents a significant substantive barrier to
such claims as well. By allowing some economic uses to go forward on some
portion of a property owner's land, HCPs, in effect, negate the possibility of a
Lucas-like, per se regulatory taking. Since section 10 requires HCP applicants
merely to "minimize and mitigate" the impacts of their land use, not to curtail
their activities altogether, HCP participants will probably never have all or
nearly all of their property value deprived. Indeed, landowners to whom HCPs
have been granted are unlikely even to raise a meritorious takings claim under
the ad hoc, three-factor Penn Central test. This is because, in general, HCPs
175, at 326-27.
208. Recall that over 90% of HCPs are approved, see supra note 199. The figure for wetlands fill
permits is considerably lower: For the period October 1, 1988 to September 30, 1993, for example, just
39% of applications were approved (56% were withdrawn and 5% denied). See David Farrier,
Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or Compensation for Lost
Expectations? 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 360 n.265 (1995). Consequently, the futility claim is
perhaps more persuasive in the context of wetlands fill permits than in the HCP context.
209. The price tags of two recently approved HCPs dramatically illustrate the costliness of the
process. See Kim Murphy, Timber Owners Cut a Deal to Preserve Wildlife Habitat Environment, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1995 at Al (Murray Pacific Corp. spent $1,750,000 preparing an all-species, 100-year
duration HCP for its 53,527 acres); Timber Agreement Either Model or Mistake, THE COLUMBIAN, July
7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10833607 (Plum Creek Timber spent $1,300,00 on an all-species, 50-
year duration HCP for its 170,000 acres of forest).
210. Neither the ESA nor FWS regulations include deadlines for how long the FWS may take to
review a permit application. Based on the accounts of property owners and government employees, HCP
review can take anywhere from three months to over three years. See Thompson, supra note 175, at 317.
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do not drastically affect a landowner's economic value.2 ' Given the
substantial and legitimate governmental interest in ESA regulation,2t 2
landowners have little chance of meeting even the Penn Central takings test if
an HCP permitting substantial economic uses has been approved for their
property.
A recent Court of Federal Claims case suggests that the availability of
HCPs may present a substantial impediment to takings challenges to the ESA.
In Good v. United States,213 a developer filed an action asserting that the
denial of wetlands fill permits by the Army Corps of Engineers constituted a
taking for which compensation was due.214 The Corps denied the permits on
recommendation from the FWS (pursuant to a section 7 jeopardy opinion) that
the development, as proposed, would result in jeopardy to listed endangered
species. The developer argued that the ESA required its property to be
maintained in its natural state, thus depriving it of all economic value.2"5 The
government countered that the property was not required to be maintained in
its natural state because the FWS had suggested "reasonable and prudent
alternatives" (RPAs) under which development could move forward.216 The
developer had rejected these RPAs on the grounds that such development
would not be economically viable,217 and in the alternative, on the basis that
the RPAs would themselves be unlawful in that they would cause jeopardy to
the species under section 7.21t
The court denied the takings claim because it found that the ESA did not
require the property to be left in its natural state; the FWS had identified RPAs
pursuant to which development would have been approved. 19 Moreover, the
court pointed out that development pursuant to RPAs would not be unlawful
211. For example, HCPs recently approved for two timber companies (Plum Creek Timber and
Simpson Timber) did not result in a dramatic reduction in economic value. Under Plum Creek Timber's
HCP, the lumber company permanently sets aside only 8% of its land as spotted owl habitat, while
impact on other species is mitigated not by land set-asides but by ecologically-sensitive forest
management. See Timber Agreement, supra note 209. Similarly, under Simpson Timber's HCP, the
company is required to set aside just 2,000 of its 383,100 acres in Northern California as old growth
habitat for spotted owls. See Kathie Durbin, Timber Company Wins US. Approvalfor Owl Conservation
Plan, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 26, 1992, at Al.
212. See supra Subsection II.A.I.
213. 39 Fed. Cl. 81 (1997).
214, While strictly speaking, the case arises from denial of wetlands fill permit applications,
Good can arguably be viewed as the first reported opinion discussing a regulatory takings challenge to
the ESA, in that the permits were denied after the FWS found they would result in jeopardy to
endangered species.
215. See Good, 39 Fed. Cl. at 94.
216. These "reasonable and prudent alternatives" included restricting development to the upland
portion of the property, limiting water access, and preventing the attraction of predators through deed
and property maintenance restrictions. See id. at 92.
217. See id. at 98.
218. See id. at 99.
219. See id.
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since, even if a section 9 take of a species should result, "the agency was
authorized [under the section 10 HCP provision] to permit such a take. 220
Although, strictly speaking, Good involves the denial of wetlands fill permits
(and not the denial of HCPs), its reasoning would seem to apply equally in the
context of HCP applications.
3. Availability of HCPs as Disincentive to Takings Suits
In some respects, this third and final point is little more than a
recapitulation of the first two. The section 10 HCP process imposes obstacles,
both procedural and substantive, to successful takings claims. It is, however,
instructive to consider not only the legal ramifications of HCP availability, but
also the effect on a landowner's incentives to bring suit-how the possibility
of obtaining an HCP affects a landowner's cost-benefit calculus as to whether
a takings suit is worth bringing. On the cost side of the equation, since the
takings ripeness doctrine requires a plaintiff to exhaust all available
administrative remedies prior to bringing suit, the availability of the HCP
process has the effect of substantially increasing the cost of bringing a takings
claim. Even if the landowner does not believe a suitable HCP will be
approved and thus prefers to file a takings claim, he must nonetheless go
through the motions of developing, submitting and awaiting decision on an
HCP. On the benefit side, the availability of HCPs reduces the benefit of a
takings suit in two important ways. First, the possibility of obtaining an HCP
significantly reduces a plaintiffs probability of success on the merits of a
takings suit. Second, even if a plaintiff is successful, the marginal benefit of
the suit-the recovery minus the value or uses permitted under an approved or
approvable HCP-may be less than the suit's cost in legal expenses.
In sum, the availability of HCPs reduces the value of a potential takings
suit by (1) decreasing its likelihood of success, (2) decreasing its marginal
return (since an HCP would have given back at least some value to the
owner), and (3) increasing the costs of litigation (by requiring pursuit of an
HCP, just to satisfy ripeness).
IV. The HCP Process and Recent ESA Reforms as Dictated by Takings Law
Although the HCP process is arguably the most important explanation for
the dearth of regulatory takings claims under the ESA, this is not to say-as
some have seemed to assert221-- that HCPs work against landowners. On the
220. Id. at 100.
221. Republican Representative Don Young (of Alaska) remarks that "HCPs will not be the
salvation of private land and ESA disputes." Steve Hansen, Endangered Species Programs to Be
Examined at Congressional Oversight Hearing (visited July 23, 1997)
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contrary, HCPs benefit landowners (which accounts for the rarity of takings
claims) by insulating them from unduly burdensome applications of ESA
regulations. The availability of HCPs notwithstanding, many critics of the
ESA would like to limit the statute severely, 222 fearing, perhaps, that the FWS
will not always be so free in granting HCPs, and that, at bottom, the Court's
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence does not protect landowners from onerous
ESA regulation.223
The property rights movement's worry that HCPs will not always be so
generously approved may be a valid concern. 24 However, an overhaul of the
ESA-much less its repeal-is unnecessary to protect property owners'
interests because these interests are already guaranteed by the Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence. Indeed, the addition of the HCP process to
the ESA, as well as other recent reforms designed to mitigate the Act's
impacts on private property, can be seen as responsive to-and perhaps
compelled by-the development of regulatory takings doctrine during the last
two decades. The ESA, as currently administered (in light of FWS support for
landowner-friendly habitat conservation planning), rarely deprives property
owners of all or nearly all economic value. Thus, if Congress wishes the ESA
<http://www.house.gov./resources/press/1996/723esa.htm>. Representative Young is additionally
worried that, "[t]he enormous costs, delays, questions about regulatory authority and litigation have
contributed to the numerous questions about the use of HCPs as the cure for all of the ESA-related land
use problems." Id.
222. There are two main types of proposals for limiting the impact of the ESA on private land.
First, there are proposals to expand the criteria for listing of species (and thus list fewer species) to
include the potential for species recovery, the cost of recovering a species, the economic and social
benefit of a species, and the loss of jobs resulting from a species listing, among other factors. See
Hearing on Endangered Species Act and Lifting the Moratorium on Listings Before the House Comm.
on Resources, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Robin L. Rivett, Pacific Legal Foundation), available in
1996 WL 10828831. Second, there are proposals for "just compensation" bills requiring the government
to compensate landowners for diminutions in value (occasioned by ESA regulations) above a certain
threshold. See discussion of compensation bills in the 104th Congress, supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
223. Representative Charles Taylor approvingly quotes the Court's language in Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), that the Takings Clause "was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole." Taylor, supra note 2, at 786. Taylor concludes, however, that the Court is lax in
its application of the Takings Clause: "with the recent increase in what many people see as
uncompensated 'takilizs,' the Court has shown that it does not always practice what it preaches." Id.
224. One commentator has suggested that recent reforms of the HCP process-the "no surprises"
policy and the three to ten-month timetable on review of proposed HCPs--could altogether prevent the
approval of some HCPs:
The provisions of the No Surprises policy place enormous pressure on the limited
resources of the FWS. ... [T]he FWS is also mandated to meet strict time constraints
under the new directive. It is quite possible that these provisions will ... in fact prevent
issuance altogether. Without having the time necessary to verify scientific information,
the FWS may be reluctant to issue incidental take permits under an HCP.
Eric Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No Surprises and the
Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 371,404 (1996).
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to protect property interests to the fullest extent required by current
jurisprudence, it should enthusiastically support habitat conservation planning
and satisfy itself with making minor adjustments to improve the HCP process.
A. The HCP Process as Shaped by Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
As noted earlier,225 the ESA was initially enacted at a time when
regulatory takings law was virtually a dead letter. During the nearly twenty-
five years of the Act's existence, regulatory takings law has enjoyed a
renaissance. At the same time, the ESA has been amended and FWS
administrative policies modified in ways that have significantly changed the
manner in which ESA regulations affect private property. This section will
consider whether there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the revival
of regulatory takings doctrine and the FWS's increasing concern for the
ESA's effect on property owners.
1. Section 10 HCP Program as a Response to Penn Central and Agins
Decided in 1978 and 1980 respectively, Penn Central and Agins had
important implications for regulatory programs, such as the ESA, that affect
private property. Penn Central is notable not only for announcing the three-
factor takings test, but also for its discussion and approval of the concept of
transferable development rights (TDRs). Under New York City's TDR
program, landowners whose proposed development was denied by the zoning
board became eligible for TDRs, which created rights to develop other parcels
elsewhere in the city. The availability of TDRs is important to the regulatory
takings analysis because, as the Penn Central Court observed, "the rights
afforded are valuable. '226 Accordingly, the granting of TDRs must be taken
into account as part of the inquiry into the economic impact of the regulation,
the second prong of the Penn Central test. "While these rights may well not
[constitute] 'just compensation' if a 'taking' [occurs], the rights nevertheless
undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law [imposes] ....
The Penn Central Court-by announcing a three-factor test for regulatory
takings and by endorsing the concept of TDRs-sent two distinct messages to
those concerned with the constitutionality of ESA regulations. First,
regulations may effect takings if their impact on private property values and
reasonable expectations outweighs the state interest served. Second, the
availability of a TDR or TDR-like program, by mitigating the economic
225. See supra Subsection III.A.4.
226. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
227. Id.
Yale Journal on Regulation
impact of a regulation on landowners, may insulate such regulations from
takings challenges.
Close on the heels of Penn Central-the first case in which the Court
embraced the concept of regulatory takings in several decades---came the
Court's decision in Agins, affirming the possibility of regulatory takings and
confirming the Penn Central principle that if some development is permitted,
then the impact of the regulation is lessened and a taking is unlikely to be
found. The Agins Court rejected the plaintiffs takings claim because,
although he was not allowed to develop his property as intensively as he
would have liked, the zoning ordinance still permitted building as many as
five houses on his five-acre parcel.228 The ordinance, therefore, as in Penn
Central, occasioned a diminution in value, not a taking.
In terms of function, HCPs are the conservation equivalent of TDRs. Like
TDRs, HCPs mitigate the economic impact of regulation on the regulated
parcel. Whereas TDRs accomplish this by providing development rights in
other parcels, HCPs provide diminished, but nonetheless valuable, rights in
the subject property itself. As the Court made clear in Penn Central and Agins,
the affording of some rights to economic use (whether on the parcel itself, or
on other parcels) mitigates the private impact of the regulation, making a
taking unlikely. Moreover, the HCP program, by avoiding successful takings
claims, allows the FWS to regulate more at a lower cost. Even though HCPs
provide some concessions to landowners, the value of rights created in an
HCP is, as in the case of the TDRs in Penn Central, less than the "just
compensation" that would be required if a taking were found. In effect, the
concessions to economic uses granted in HCPs function as an insurance
premium against the possibility of a successful takings claim requiring full
compensation.
Since the HCP program was instituted in 1982, the Court's Fifth
Amendment decisions have consistently reaffirmed the possibility of
regulatory takings and reiterated the importance of TDR-type programs in
avoiding such claims. For example, the majority and concurring opinions in
the recent Lucas case are suggestive of how the existence of a TDR-type
program (such as section 10 HCPs) negates the possibility of a per se taking
and may ultimately be determinative of even the three-factor takings analysis.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence explicitly acknowledges the importance of a
variance or permit program to the takings question. Upon observing the case's
"unusual posture"-that after the suit was filed but prior to its reaching the
Court, South Carolina had amended its Beachfront Management Act to
authorize the issuance of variances from the Act's general limitations-Justice
Kennedy remarked that "[t]he availability of this alternative [issuance of
228. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1979).
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variances], if it can be invoked, may dispose of petitioner's claim of a
permanent taking." '229 The same may perhaps be said with regard to the
availability of HCPs in the context of takings claims under the ESA.
In sum, the general concept behind the HCP program-that as long as
some activity is allowed on some portion of the regulated parcel, the property
owner will not be deprived of all economic use-is suggested by the Court's
recent regulatory takings jurisprudence. Furthermore, as the following
subsections will demonstrate, recent administrative reforms of the ESA-the
small landowner exemption, the safe harbor program and the "no surprises"
policy-may also be seen as motivated by the Court's takings doctrine.
2. The Small Landowner Exemption
In 1995, the FWS proposed a regulation exempting most residential and
small landowners from the Section 9 take prohibition where only threatened
species are involved.2" The FWS justifies the exemption on the grounds that
"the relative habitat value of residential property is very limited in most
cases"231 and development will have "no lasting effect on the likelihood of
survival and recovery of threatened species. ' 232 While the stated justification
is certainly plausible, it is perhaps an unstated, underlying concern that is
primarily responsible for the exemption: concern over the takings implications
of applying ESA restrictions against small landowners.
Simply as a matter of public opinion, applying ESA restrictions against
small landowners is bad politics. But the exemption is not just a matter of
public relations. Cases in which the ESA is applied against small landowners
are, for several reasons, more likely to result in a meritorious takings claim.
First, small landowners are more likely to have their entire property affected
by a regulation and are thus likely to be deprived of all or nearly all economic
value.233 Second, residential land uses are unlikely to qualify as actionable
nuisances at common law and thus the nuisance exception to takings is
unlikely to apply.2 34 Third, because of the high cost of preparing HCPs, small
landowners will seldom be able to develop their own HCPs.2 35 The small
landowner exemption thus makes legal as well as political sense.
229. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
230. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Rule Exempting Certain
Small Landowners and Low-Impact Activities from Endangered Species Act Requirements for
Threatened Species, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,419 (1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.31) (proposed July 20,
1995).
231. Id. at 37,420.
232. Id. at 37,419.
233. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
234. See, e.g., id.
235. See Rivett, supra note 9, at 529 ("HCPs have proven virtually cost-prohibitive for small
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3. The Safe Harbor Program
The safe harbor program is, in effect, designed to align landowners'
incentives with species preservation by permitting landowners to improve the
ecological value of their land (e.g., by planting trees or removing non-native
species) without having to worry that they will be subject to ESA regulations
if a listed species subsequently moves onto the land. 36 Where voluntary
habitat improvement would lead to a "measur[able] . . . conservation
benefit," '237 landowners are invited to contract with the FWS for the assurance
that ESA regulations will not be enforced against them on the basis of their
enhancement of habitat.
The safe harbor program is not only prudent policy, it is good law in that
it makes administration of the ESA consistent with the policies, if not the legal
standards, of recent takings cases such as Lucas. Under traditional takings
law, regulations that seek to secure a benefit-e.g., preservation of species
newly arrived because of habitat enhancement-are not exempt from the Fifth
Amendment requirement of compensation. Although Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, criticizes the harm/benefit distinction as conclusory, 25 the
same distinction (though based on "objective" common law principles, instead
of mere characterization) is embodied in Lucas's limitation of the police
power takings exception to those harms cognizable at common law. Not only
is it doubtful that a harm to a species is a common law harm,239 it is equally
dubious to characterize a landowner's withdrawal of a benefit (e.g., cutting
trees she has planted) as harm. The safe harbor program thus tacitly endorses
Lucas's idea that property owners' reasonable expectations include the right to
conduct non-nuisance land use activities.
4. The "No Surprises" Policy
Consistent with its goal of "treating owners fairly"240 by making HCPs as
attractive to property owners as possible, the FWS has recently adopted a so-
landowners who do not happen to be included in large area or project HCPs funded by large landowners,
developers, or government.").
236. See Thompson, supra note 175, at 322 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PROTECTING
AMERICA'S LIVING HERITAGE: A FAIR, COOPERATIVE AND SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND APPROACH TO
IMPROVING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 8-9 (1995)); see also Announcement of Draft Safe Harbor
Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,178, 32,178 (proposed June 12, 1997).
237. Id. (citation omitted).
238. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024-25.
239. See supra Subsection II.A.3.
240. "Treating landowners fairly" is one of ten principles the Department of Interior has
embraced in fashioning administrative reforms under the Act. See Thompson, supra note 175, at 380
n.85.
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called "no surprises" policy.2"' The policy provides that "no additional land
use restrictions or financial compensation will be required of the [incidental
take] permit holder with respect to species covered by the permit, even if
unforeseen circumstances arise after the permit is issued indicating that
additional mitigation is needed for a given species covered by a permit." '242
Similar to the safe harbor program, the "no surprises" policy is informed by a
conservative, Lucas-like conception of property expectations: Actions
permissible in the past under an HCP will be permissible for all time (at least
for the duration of the HCP) notwithstanding changed circumstances such as
the listing of a species. "According to one Interior Department official, the no
surprises policy is as close as one comes to a 'federal vested development
right. 1"243
Taken together, the safe harbor program and the "no surprises" policy
bring to mind Professor Sax's interpretation of Lucas as expressing the
"sentiment that a state should compensate landowners who, through no fault
of their own, lose property rights because of scientific or social
transformations. '244 Recent FWS reforms-from small landowner exemption,
to safe harbor, to "no surprises"-institutionalize the Lucas sentiment as part
and parcel of the administration of the Act.
B. Proposals for ESA Reform: Adjustments to the HCP Program
The Court's takings jurisprudence-especially as expressed in recent
cases such as Lucas-protects private property from the most onerous ESA
regulations. While takings cases under the ESA are virtually nonexistent, this
is not because takings law fails to protect property. To the contrary, it is
because of the strength of takings law that the ESA is administered-through
the HCP program, in particular-with considerable respect for the impact on
landowners, making takings claims unlikely. Consequently, to the extent that
private property protection is the motivation behind calls for reform, there is
no need to radically overhaul the ESA. By emphasizing habitat conservation
planning, the FWS substantially achieves its goal of "treating landowners
fairly."
Nonetheless, to the extent that ESA reform is motivated by protection of
private property-whether as an end in itself or as a means of avoiding takings
241. See Habitat Conservation Planning Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859,
8859 (1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 222) (describing the history of the "no surprises" policy, which
was initially announced in 1994).
242. Id.
243. Thompson, supra note 175, at 323 (quoting Donald J. Barry, Remarks at Conference on
Biodiversity Protection: Implementation and Reform of the Endangered Species Act, University of
Colorado School of Law (June 10, 1996)).
244. Sax, supra note 152, at 1449.
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challenges or diffusing political pressure-there are several minor adjustments
to the HCP program that would be desirable. Moreover, these adjustments are
suggested, if not compelled, by recent regulatory takings decisions.
1. Expedite the HCP Approval Process
One of the most frequent criticisms of the HCP program relates to the
time-consuming (and thus costly) nature of the permitting process.245
According to FWS personnel and property owners, initial negotiations have
taken anywhere from three months to three years.246 Although the factors
contributing to delays are many (insufficient biological knowledge, public
controversy, and lack of FWS resources, to name only a few),247 such delays
are ultimately possible because neither the ESA nor FWS regulations establish
firm deadlines for FWS response. Not being legally compelled to streamline
the section 10 process, the FWS has announced as one of its non-binding
guiding principles that the "processing [of] incidental take permit applications
...be as expeditious and efficient as possible," and that the permitting
process be streamlined to the "maximum extent practicable and allowable
under law. '248 The FWS expects to meet "processing targets" of three to ten
months, depending on the impact and size of the proposed HCP.249 While the
FWS's guiding principles and processing targets are laudable, recent
experience with the HCP program demonstrates that these principles and
targets are more aspirational than realistic.250
In a statute that contains deadlines for virtually every other administrative
action (e.g., ninety days to consider whether petition to list or delist a species
is justified,25' twelve months to find whether petitioned action is warranted,252
and ninety days to produce a jeopardy finding 253), it is unclear why there
should not be such deadlines for the approval of HCPs. Moreover,
streamlining the HCP process is not only good policy, it may-at least in the
most egregious instances of delay-be constitutionally compelled by the
Court's temporary regulatory takings doctrine. Announced in First English
245. See Lin, supra note 23, at 396-422 (1996) (citing delays as the number one criticism of the
HCP process and proposing reforms to avoid such delays).
246. See Thompson, supra note 175, at 317.
247. See Lin, supra note 23, at 396-411.
248. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PRELIMINARY DRAFT
HANDBOOK FOR HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING 5-6
(1994).
249. See id. at 8.
250. See supra note 246.
251. See Endangered Species Act § 4(b)(3)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (1994).
252. See Endangered Species Act § 4(b)(3)(B).
253. See Endangered Species Act § 7(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(1) (1994).
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Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,254 the
temporary takings doctrine provides that "[i]nvalidation of the ordinance ...
after [a] period of time, though converting the taking into a 'temporary' one, is
not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the just compensation
clause." '255 Applied to the context of HCPs under the ESA, the same logic
would dictate that approval of an HCP, after a period of time, does not
necessarily preclude a claim of temporary taking based on the time during
which HCP review was pending.
While it is unclear to what extent the temporary regulatory takings
analysis applies to permitting programs such as section 10, First English at
least opens up the possibility for temporary takings claims. On the one hand,
the Court "limit[s] [its] holding to the facts presented, and of course [does] not
deal with the quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal
delays in obtaining building permits [or] variances." '256 In the next breath,
however, the Court notes that "our present holding will undoubtedly [limit]
the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners." '257 Although the temporary
takings doctrine has not been applied successfully in cases of permit delays,
258
First English at least suggests the possibility of a successful temporary takings
suit in such cases where delay is abnormal or extraordinary.259
2. Modify "No Surprises " Policy to Guarantee Real Certainty for
Landowners
The "no surprises" policy provides that no further mitigation will be
required of a landowner when a species on his land-unlisted at the time an
HCP is entered into-later becomes listed, if and only if that species had been
addressed in the approved HCP.260 Thus, as the "no surprises" policy currently
stands, a landowner may rest assured that no additional mitigation will be
required for species covered in the HCP irrespective of their status under the
ESA as endangered, threatened, or unlisted. Although this is not a trivial
254. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
255. Id. at 319.
256. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (a three-year
delay in developing subdivision due to improper federal assertion of jurisdiction over wetlands therein
was not a taking).
259. It is not clear what constitutes an "abnormal" delay. Perhaps three, four or five years
amounts to abnormal delay since the First Evangelical Court found a temporary taking where the
ordinance (prior to being withdrawn) deprived use for "a considerable period of years." First English,
482 U.S. at 322. But see Tabb Lakes, 10 F.3d at 803 (temporary taking was not found after a three-year
delay). For another commentator's opinion that delays in HCP approval could perhaps give rise to
legally cognizable temporary takings suits, see Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The
Endangered Species Act and Private Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 390 (1994).
260. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
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assurance, it hardly eliminates the possibility of surprise, since the burden is
on the landowner to identify every species that could be listed that is present
on the property. Given the limits of biological science and knowledge-
renowned biologist E.O. Wilson estimates the number of species on Earth to
be from 10,000,000 to 100,000,000, of which only 1,400,000 have been
identified 26 t-it is quite likely that even a thorough (and costly) inspection
prior to entering into an HCP would not reveal the presence of many species
that might be discovered and listed at some later time. Consequently, there
remains ample opportunity for surprise, particularly in the case of large, non-
urban parcels of property.
If the FWS wishes to provide complete certainty with its HCPs, then it
should guarantee that no further mitigation will be required in cases where a
species unknown at the time an HCP was submitted is later found on the
property. Under such a regime, landowners would still have the duty to
account for and mitigate harm to species on their property that were listed at
the time of the HCP's creation; landowners would simply be protected against
changes in the state of biological knowledge. While it is hard to argue that
such a result is constitutionally compelled, a strengthening of "no surprises" is
consistent with the Lucas sentiment that landowners should be compensated
(or exempted) when regulation, as a result of changes in scientific
understanding and through no fault of their own, deprives them of property
rights.262
3. Assure an HCP's Mitigation Measures are Proportional to Expected
Harms
At the heart of the HCP program is the understanding that the HCP
applicant will minimize and mitigate her impacts on protected species. Neither
the ESA nor FWS regulations give more definite guidance on what
minimization and mitigation measures are required. Such measures, it might
be said, are limited only by the imagination of the applicant and the discretion
of the FWS. Again, however, the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence
provides constitutional limits on what may be required of landowners.
The Court's decisions in Nollan and Dolan both speak to the appropriate
content of HCPs. Nollan requires that any "exaction" or mitigation measure
have an essential nexus to the biodiversity impact caused by the landowner's
use.2 63 Dolan mandates that mitigation measures must be "roughly
261. See Wilson, supra note 51, at 132-33.
262. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
263. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also discussion of
Nollan's nexus requirement supra Subsection I.B.3.
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proportional" to biodiversity harms.2" The Nollan nexus requirement would
appear to be easily met in the context of HCPs, since the exaction involved is
mitigation of impacts, in other words, the direct remedying of the subject
harm. On the other hand, definitive guidance is lacking as to the
proportionality of the mitigation measures. There is no evidence that the FWS
currently demands mitigation measures disproportionate to the impacts
contemplated by the property owner. 65 However, there is no assurance,
statutory or otherwise, that the FWS will not make such disproportionate
demands at some point in the future, whether as a result of political pressure
or other changed circumstances. Section 10 should be amended to explicitly
require proportionality between the impacts of land use and the mitigation
measures required.266
4. Assure Landowners of Property Rights in HCPs
Finally, it must be recognized that the ESA's administrators respect
private property, and thus avoid constitutional takings, only as long as the
government lives up to its side of the bargain under an HCP. As one
commentator put it, "although the permittee appears to have legally protected
rights under an HCP agreement, until a court affirms this position, certainty
must come from a permittee's belief that the government will abide by its
promises. 2 67 In the event, then, that the government does not uphold its side
of the bargain-for example, if, in a last-ditch attempt to save a species from
extinction, the FWS requires the commitment of additional land for mitigation
beyond the level originally agreed upon 268-the question arises as to whether a
landowner then has recourse to a takings claim. The threshold issue of this
takings inquiry relates to whether an HCP constitutes "property" under the
264. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994); see also supra note 93.
265. The lack of takings cases under the ESA and the near 100% approval rate for proposed
HCPs, see supra note 199, both suggest that the FWS does not typically demand mitigation measures
disproportionate to the expected harms.
266. For other perspectives on how Nollan and Dolan might influence the way the HCP program
is administered, see Meltz, supra note 259, at 410-11 ("[I]mplicit in 'fairness and justice' is that the
affirmative burden on the landowner be proportional to the harm that her proposed action might have, a
relationship that may soon be given more precise definition [in Dolan]."); Thompson, supra note 175, at
339-43 (suggesting that Nollan and Dolan put limitations on how regional HCPs may be structured, for
example, by raising doubts about the proportionality of flat rate development fees).
267. Fisher, supra note 224, at 405.
268. Not only might the FWS unilaterally amend the terms of an HCP, it could (and indeed,
would perhaps be required to) revoke an HCP altogether if a species, for whatever reason, approaches
the brink of extinction. John Engbring, FWS supervisor of conservation plans in Oregon and
Washington, was paraphrased as saying, "if a species is in grave danger of extinction because of what a
[landowner] is doing, the [FWS] can always issue . . . a 'jeopardy ruling' [under Section 7], and yank
[their] permit." Leslie Brown, Cutting a Clear, New Path, MORNING NEWS TRIB., Nov. 2, 1997, at G2.
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Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause: Do permittees have a property interest in
an HCP?
Although courts have at various times embraced differing definitions of
property,269 the general rule, since United States v. General Motors Corp.,270 is
that property "denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to
the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it" and is not
limited to physical things.27' Moreover, General Motors's expansive definition
of property has been affirmed in more recent cases, such as Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co.,272 where the Court recognized a property interest in a
company's trade secrets which, in turn, was protected by the Takings
Clause.273 However, while the Court's general definition of property is quite
broad,274 it is less clear whether Fifth Amendment property protections are
implicated in the context of government-granted permits. Neither General
Motors nor Monsanto are directly applicable to the permitting context since
they involved property interests in leases and trade secrets, respectively.
While there are no cases in which a court has decided whether HCPs give
rise to property rights,275 courts have considered the issue of property interests
in permits in several other contexts. In Hage v. United States, 2 6 a recent case
out of the Court of Federal Claims, the court found that ranchers did not have
a property interest in grazing permits.277 The result in Hage is less important
than the analysis it relies on in reaching its conclusion. The court identified
three factors as relevant to its inquiry of whether the permit gives rise to
property rights for purposes of the Fifth Amendment: congressional intent to
create (or not) property rights in the permits; the extent to which the permit
269. Among the many possible definitions of property are: property as tangible things, property
as valuable rights created by positive law, property as vested rights created by positive law. See
Peterson, supra note 81, at 1308-16.
270. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
271. Id. at 378 (finding a property right in a leasehold interest).
272. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
273. See id. at 1003-04.
274. In dictum, the General Motors Court noted that the Takings Clause "is addressed to every
sort of interest the citizen may possess" (emphasis added). General Motors, 323 U.S. at 378.
275. Cf Southwest Diversified, Inc. v. City of Brisbane, 652 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Cal. 1986). The
court noted in dictum that
Although the developers have alleged that they have been given an entitlement, i.e., a
protectable property interest, by the Section 10(a) permit, the permit itself purports to give no
rights to develop but only to 'take' an endangered species under limited conditions. If the
developers have an entitlement or protectable property interest at all, it is derived from
assurances received from the City .... Whether or not that conduct creates a property interest
is a matter of state law.
Id. at 796 n.9.
276. 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (1996).
277. Id. at 171; see also United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment does not require compensation for value added to fee lands by grazing permits which were
revocable under the statute); Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1457 (1998) (holding that neither
grazing preference nor grazing permit constitutes a compensable property interest).
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has characteristics of private property; and the source from which the permit's
value was created. The Hage court found no property interest in the grazing
permits because (1) the Granger-Thye Act expressly stated that issuance of the
permit did not grant "any right, title, interest or estate"; (2) the permit did not
have characteristics of private property since it did not give permittees the
right to exclude; and (3) the sovereign itself created the value, where there was
none before, by issuing the permit.278
HCPs are readily distinguishable from grazing permits, and in fact, their
issuance would appear to create property rights under the Hage analysis. First,
the ESA never states, implicitly or explicitly, that issuance of an HCP does not
give rise to any rights. Second, HCPs exhibit the characteristics of private
property in that their owners retain the right to exclude. Third, the value in
HCPs derives not from a government-conferred privilege, but from the
underlying value of the property to which the HCP relates.
Based on the foregoing analysis, a court would, more likely than not, find
that HCPs rise to the level of protected property. Nonetheless, insofar as
proponents of habitat conservation planning advertise it as providing certainty
for landowners, the ESA should be amended to explicitly assure property
interests in HCPs. Without such explicit assurance, landowners have some
reason to doubt the value of HCP protections and would perhaps be more
inclined to file a takings suit than participate in the HCP program.
Conclusion
The relationship between the ESA and the Takings Clause is born of
conflict: The Fifth Amendment protects property while the ESA protects
species. This Article, however, has sought to demonstrate that the two bodies
of law do not exist and develop independently of the other. Despite the
absence of takings cases involving ESA regulations in federal courts, the ESA
is informed and limited by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As
the Court's takings jurisprudence over the last two decades has more
vigorously protected private property from government regulation, application
of the ESA to private property has been increasingly constrained. Takings
cases have not resulted because the FWS and Department of Interior-by
promoting the availability of HCPs and implementing programs such as the
"no surprises" policy and the Safe Harbor program-have been careful not to
trigger the taking of all or nearly all economic value or to interfere with
reasonable, investment-backed expectations. In effect, the Fifth Amendment
has subtly but significantly influenced the ways in which the ESA is
administered.
278. See Hage, 35 Fed. CL. at 169-71.

